2007 (9) TMI 542 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Non-suiting the petitioner for making an application under the provisions of section 5 of the said Act - Held that - It is clear from the relevant period that the tax case (appeal) has been filed before the Taxation Special Tribunal and the Special Tribunal received on January 29, 1999 for further process and it has been processed and returned on June 23, 2003 for compliance of certain defects. After complying with the defects, it has been re-presented on June 25, 2003. Thus, it shows that the papers have not been rejected by the Tribunal once and for all. Further, with reference to the terminology employed in the section file and pending , it is impermissible to import any additional word in the provision that in order to be eligible to file an application under section 5 of the 2002 Act, the appeal must be admitted as the word admission has not been used in section 4 of the 2002 Act. Even assuming that in a case the Special Tribunal did not find any case for admission on merits, that has to be stated by passing an order for dismissal. That contingency neither was visualised nor did it happen in this case. It is enough if an appeal or revision is filed and pending for consideration. Thus view that the Tribunal has taken a correct view. W.P. dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Eligibility for settlement under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 2002.
2. Definition and interpretation of "filed" and "pending" in the context of appeals.
3. Validity of the appeal filed by the first respondent before the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Eligibility for Settlement under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 2002:
The core issue revolves around whether the first respondent's appeal qualifies for settlement under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 2002 ("the 2002 Act"). The Act allows for the expeditious settlement of disputes relating to arrears of tax, penalty, or interest. Section 4(1) stipulates that an appeal or revision must be "filed on or before February 28, 2002, and pending" on that date to be eligible for settlement under Section 5. The State contended that since the appeal was not admitted by February 28, 2002, it did not qualify as "pending."

2. Definition and Interpretation of "Filed" and "Pending":
The court examined the definitions of "filed" and "pending" from various legal dictionaries and precedents. "Filed" was understood to mean the delivery of a document to the proper officer for action or preservation. "Pending" was defined as an action that is begun but not yet completed, remaining undecided. The court emphasized that an appeal is considered pending from the time it is filed until final judgment is rendered. The court noted that the terminology "filed and pending" in Section 4(1) does not require the appeal to be admitted, only that it is filed and awaiting a decision.

3. Validity of the Appeal Filed by the First Respondent:
The first respondent's appeal was initially filed on January 29, 1999, and re-presented on June 25, 2003, after rectifying certain defects. The State argued that the appeal was abandoned and re-presented only to avail benefits under the 2002 Act. The court, however, found that the appeal was never rejected and remained pending. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shatrusailya Digvijaysingh Jadeja, which held that an appeal remains pending from its inception until final judgment, regardless of its validity or competence. The court concluded that the appeal was indeed pending as required by the 2002 Act.

Conclusion:
The court held that the first respondent's appeal was filed and pending as required under Section 4 of the 2002 Act. The court affirmed the Special Tribunal's decision, which allowed the first respondent's application for settlement. The writ petition filed by the State was dismissed, and the court found no illegality or irregularity in the Tribunal's order. Consequently, the connected W.P.M.P. No. 1576 of 2005 was also dismissed.