1983 (1) TMI 278 - AT - Customs

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Rejection of refund claim due to time-bar under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Applicability of exemption notification No. 48-Customs, dated 1-3-79.
3. Jurisdiction of the assessing officer in levying countervailing duty.
4. Applicability of general law of limitation versus specific limitation under the Customs Act.
5. Distinction between different types of wrong assessments and their impact on jurisdiction.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Rejection of Refund Claim Due to Time-Bar Under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962:

The appellants, M/s. Nanavati & Co. Pvt. Ltd., argued that their refund claim was wrongly rejected by the Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector of Customs on the grounds of being time-barred under Section 27 of the Customs Act. They contended that the time-limit of 6 months should not apply as the assessment was beyond the jurisdiction of the assessing officer. However, the tribunal referenced the Supreme Court judgment in AIR 1976 SC 638 (M/s. Madras Rubber Factory v. Union of India) to affirm that the time-bar under Section 27 is applicable even if the assessment and collection of duty were alleged to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities. The tribunal concluded that the rejection of the refund claim due to the time-bar was appropriate.

2. Applicability of Exemption Notification No. 48-Customs, Dated 1-3-79:

The appellants claimed that their imported goods, 'Oleyl Cetyl Alcohol,' were exempted from countervailing duty by notification No. 48-Customs, dated 1-3-79. They argued that the assessment to such customs duty was beyond the jurisdiction of the assessing officer due to this exemption. However, the tribunal found that Section 27 covers all claims of refund of any sums paid as duty, without distinguishing between different kinds of duties or the jurisdictional basis of the assessment. The tribunal emphasized that all wrong assessments, whether due to applying a higher rate or levying a duty when none was due, are subject to the same limitation provisions under the Customs Act.

3. Jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in Levying Countervailing Duty:

The appellants argued that the assessing officer acted beyond his jurisdiction by levying countervailing duty on goods that were exempted. The tribunal rejected this argument, stating that all wrong assessments, whether due to incorrect rates or exemptions, are exercises of power in excess of jurisdiction. The tribunal held that the Customs Act does not distinguish between different types of excess payments and that all refund claims are subject to the same limitation period under Section 27.

4. Applicability of General Law of Limitation Versus Specific Limitation Under the Customs Act:

The appellants contended that the general law of limitation (3 years) should apply instead of the 6-month limit under Section 27 of the Customs Act. The tribunal disagreed, stating that the Customs Act is a self-contained law with specific provisions for limitation periods. It emphasized that the framers of the law intended for the specific time-limit in the Customs Act to be observed and that there was no reason to apply the general law of limitation.

5. Distinction Between Different Types of Wrong Assessments and Their Impact on Jurisdiction:

The tribunal addressed the appellants' argument that assessments made in excess of jurisdiction should not be subject to the time-bar of the Customs Act. It concluded that all wrong assessments, whether due to incorrect rates or exemptions, are exercises of power in excess of jurisdiction and are subject to the same limitation provisions. The tribunal emphasized that the Customs Act expressly forbids refund claims not in accordance with its provisions and that the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of these limitations.

Separate Judgment by M. Gouri Shankar Murthy:

While agreeing with the conclusion, M. Gouri Shankar Murthy elaborated on certain legal propositions. He clarified that absence of jurisdiction ab-initio manifests in specific scenarios such as ultra-vires provisions, errors in collateral facts, or exceeding constitutional limits. He noted that a quasi-judicial authority like a Customs officer does not lose jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion in law or facts. He reiterated that the statutory limitation period applies strictly to proceedings under the statute and that erroneous determinations do not result from want of jurisdiction or acting in excess of jurisdiction. He concluded that the appellants' refund claim was rightly rejected as time-barred under Section 27 of the Customs Act and that the appellants could not argue against the applicability of the limitation period after applying for a refund under the same section.