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Issues Involved:
1. Hereditary Rights of Worship 2. Validity of Trustees' Actions 3. Res Judicata and Estoppel 4. Limitation Period 5. Application of Section 23 of the Limitation Act Detailed Analysis: 1. Hereditary Rights of Worship: The appellants, who are members of the Waghmare family, claimed hereditary rights as worshippers in the Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, Alandi. They argued that their ancestors held these rights and managed the temple affairs, including worship. This claim was contested by the trustees, who viewed the appellants as mere servants. In the initial suit filed in 1911, the trial court dismissed the appellants' claim of ownership, a decision upheld by the High Court in 1921. However, the High Court acknowledged that the appellants had some hereditary rights as pujaris, which could be addressed in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Validity of Trustees' Actions: The trustees dismissed eleven Guravs in 1911 for gross misconduct and appointed new servants to perform worship duties. The appellants challenged these actions, asserting their hereditary rights. The trial court and the High Court both found that the trustees had the authority to dismiss the Guravs and appoint new servants, thereby negating the appellants' claims of hereditary rights. 3. Res Judicata and Estoppel: The trustees argued that the appellants' claims were barred by res judicata and estoppel, given the previous litigation outcomes. Both the trial court and the High Court rejected these defenses, affirming that the appellants' claims were not precluded by prior judgments. 4. Limitation Period: The primary issue in the Supreme Court was whether the appellants' suits were barred by limitation. The trial court ruled that Article 124 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a twelve-year period for suits concerning hereditary offices, did not apply. Instead, the suits were governed by Article 120, which prescribes a six-year period. The High Court agreed, concluding that the cause of action arose either in September 1922, when the trustees filed a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, or in November 1922, when the appellants were dispossessed following a decree. Consequently, the suits filed beyond the six-year period were deemed time-barred. 5. Application of Section 23 of the Limitation Act: The appellants contended that Section 23 of the Limitation Act, which addresses continuing wrongs, should apply. They argued that the trustees' actions constituted a continuing wrong, thereby extending the limitation period. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, clarifying that Section 23 pertains to continuing wrongs, not continuing rights. The Court held that the trustees' actions in 1922 constituted a complete injury, and the subsequent dispossession did not amount to a recurring tort. Therefore, Section 23 did not apply, and the suits were barred by limitation. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that the appellants' suits were barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The Court dismissed the appeals, directing each party to bear its own costs. Despite recognizing the appellants' hereditary rights, the Court concluded that the claims were filed beyond the permissible period, thereby rendering them time-barred.
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