1996 (12) TMI 388 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the compromise decree was satisfied by the delivery of possession to the appellant's attorney.
2. Whether the decree was adjusted by the creation of a fresh licence.
3. Applicability of Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issue 1: Satisfaction of Compromise Decree
The appellant, the landlady of "Pink City Hotel," filed for eviction against the respondent, a tenant, which ended in a compromise decree on 16.9.1991. The decree required the respondent to vacate the premises by 10th February 1992 and pay rent until then. The respondent claimed to have handed over possession to the appellant's attorney, Ramesh B. Sharma, on 31.10.1991, and continued to occupy the premises as a licensee. The trial court accepted this claim, finding the decree satisfied and inexecutable.

Issue 2: Adjustment by Fresh Licence
The respondent argued that he was allowed to remain as a licensee, paying a higher fee, which amounted to an adjustment of the decree. The appellant countered that the power of attorney was canceled, and no fresh licence could be validly created. The trial court found that the attorney could legally create a fresh licence, thus satisfying the decree.

Issue 3: Applicability of Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 2 CPC
The appellant contended that any adjustment of the decree should have been certified under Order XXI Rule 2 CPC. The respondent argued that Section 47 CPC allowed the executing court to determine questions of execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. The Supreme Court held that Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 2 must be harmonized. While Section 47 confers jurisdiction to decide execution-related questions, Order XXI Rule 2 mandates that any adjustment must be certified. The court emphasized that uncertified adjustments cannot be recognized by the executing court.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent's plea of delivering possession and subsequent licence was an adjustment that required certification under Order XXI Rule 2. Since it was not certified, the executing court should not have recognized it. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the trial court and High Court, and directing the executing court to proceed with the eviction decree. The appellant was awarded costs throughout.