2014 (7) TMI 1140 - SC - Indian Laws

Bomb Blast in Surat - Blast due to demolition of Barbri Maszid - Offence recorded under TADA - Compliance to Section 20A of TADA - Held that - statute vests the grant approval in an authority specifically designated for the purpose. That being so, no one except the authority so designated, can exercise that power. Permitting exercise of the power by any other authority whether superior or inferior to the authority designated by the Statute will have the effect of re-writing the provision and defeating the legislature purpose behind the same - a course that is legally impermissible. Exercise of the power vested in the District Superintendent of Police under Section 20-A (1) would involve application of mind by the officer concerned to the material placed before him on the basis whereof, alone a decision whether or not information regarding commission of an offence under TADA should be recorded can be taken. Exercise of the power granting or refusing approval under Section 20-A (1) in its very nature casts a duty upon the officer concerned to evaluate the information and determine having regard to all attendant circumstances whether or not a case for invoking the provisions of TADA is made out. Exercise of that power by anyone other than the designated authority viz. the District Superintendent of Police would amount to such other authority clutching at the jurisdiction of the designated officer, no matter such officer or authority purporting to exercise that power is superior in rank and position to the officer authorised by law to take the decision. If the Statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner alone. All other modes or methods of doing that thing must be deemed to have been prohibited. Section 20-A (1) is mandatory is also no longer res integra having been settled by this Court in Rangku Dutta @ Ranjan Kumar Dutta v. State of Assam 2011 (5) TMI 902 - Supreme Court Of India . This Court in that case held that since the provision was couched in negative terms, the same is mandatory in nature no matter the statute does not provide any penalty for disobedience. Requirement of a mandatory statutory provision having been violated, the trial and conviction of the petitioners for offences under the TADA must be held to have been vitiated on that account. The argument that the first information report regarding the two incidents had been registered before the introduction of Section 20-A (1) in the statute book making approval of the competent authority unnecessary has not impressed us. It is true that the two incidents had taken place and cases registered regarding the same under TADA before Section 20-A (1) came on the statute book, but the fact remains that the provisions of TADA were removed from the reports pursuant to the recommendations of the Review Committee. By the time fresh evidence came to light requiring re-introduction of the provisions of the Act approval for recording information regarding commission of offences under TADA, had become necessary. The fact that such approval was considered necessary even by the investigating agency and was prayed for, only shows that the authorities were aware of the requirement of law and had consciously attempted to comply with the said requirement no matter by applying for such approval to an authority not competent to grant the same. - Decided in favour of Appellant.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the trial and conviction under TADA due to alleged non-compliance with Section 20-A (1).
2. Requirement of prior approval for recording information about TADA offences.
3. Adequacy of evidence for sustaining convictions under IPC and Explosive Substances Act independent of TADA.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the trial and conviction under TADA due to alleged non-compliance with Section 20-A (1):
The appellants contended that their trial and conviction were vitiated due to a breach of Section 20-A (1) of TADA, which mandates prior approval from the District Superintendent of Police for recording any information about the commission of an offence under TADA. The approval was instead obtained from the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, and the Additional Police Commissioner, Surat, who were not authorized under the Act. The Supreme Court held that the approval must be granted by the designated authority, i.e., the District Superintendent of Police, and not by any other authority, regardless of their rank. This non-compliance with the mandatory provision of Section 20-A (1) rendered the trial and conviction of the appellants under TADA legally unsustainable.

2. Requirement of prior approval for recording information about TADA offences:
The prosecution argued that there was no requirement for prior approval because the FIRs were registered before Section 20-A (1) was inserted into the Act. However, the Supreme Court noted that the provisions of TADA were removed from the FIRs based on the TADA Review Committee's recommendations. When fresh evidence emerged, re-introduction of TADA provisions required approval, which was sought from unauthorized authorities. The Court emphasized that the statutory provision's mandatory nature necessitated compliance, and any deviation invalidated the proceedings.

3. Adequacy of evidence for sustaining convictions under IPC and Explosive Substances Act independent of TADA:
The State argued that even without TADA, the convictions could be sustained under IPC and the Explosive Substances Act. However, the Supreme Court found that the evidence on record, including the recovery of weapons, was insufficient to justify the convictions independently of TADA. The confessional statements recorded under TADA could not be relied upon due to the procedural violations. Consequently, the Court concluded that the convictions could not be sustained.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the appellants, set aside their convictions, and ordered their release unless required in any other case. The appeals filed by the State of Gujarat for enhancement of sentences were dismissed. The judgment underscores the importance of strict compliance with statutory provisions, particularly when they are couched in mandatory terms, and highlights the consequences of procedural lapses in criminal prosecutions.