9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction and powers of a High Court to take suo motu action under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2. Competency of the High Court to take cognizance of contempt without a reference from the subordinate court or a motion by the Advocate-General. 3. Appealability of interlocutory orders under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction and Powers of a High Court to Take Suo Motu Action Under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 The Supreme Court addressed whether a High Court can take suo motu cognizance of contempt of a subordinate court under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court observed that Article 215 of the Constitution states that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The Court noted that Section 10 of the Act explicitly states that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, power, and authority in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself. The Court emphasized that Section 15(2) does not restrict the High Court's power to take suo motu cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate court. The Court held that if the Legislature intended to take away this power, it would have done so in unequivocal language. Therefore, the High Court retains the power to take suo motu cognizance of contempt of subordinate courts. 2. Competency of the High Court to Take Cognizance of Contempt Without a Reference from the Subordinate Court or a Motion by the Advocate-General The appellant contended that the High Court was not competent to take cognizance of the contempt alleged without a reference from the subordinate court or a motion by the Advocate-General, as per Section 15(2) of the Act. The High Court rejected this preliminary objection, stating that Article 215 of the Constitution preserved the High Court's power as a court of record to punish contempt of subordinate courts. The Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation, stating that Section 15(2) does not deprive the High Court of the power to take suo motu cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate court. The Court further clarified that if the High Court acts on information derived from its own sources, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own motion. However, if the High Court is directly moved by a petition from a private person, it has the discretion to refuse to entertain the petition or to take cognizance on its own motion based on the information supplied in the petition. The Court highlighted that this mode of taking suo motu cognizance should be used sparingly and in cases of grave and serious contempt. 3. Appealability of Interlocutory Orders Under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 A preliminary objection was raised by the respondent's counsel that under Section 19(1) of the Act, only a final order whereby the contemner is punished is appealable, and since the impugned order was not such an order, the appeal was incompetent. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant had also filed a petition for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. Given the importance of the matter, the Court granted leave to appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction in taking suo motu cognizance of the contempt. The case was sent back to the High Court for further proceedings in accordance with the law. The Court added a cautionary note that nothing in the judgment should be construed as an observation on the merits of the allegations against the appellant. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's jurisdiction to take suo motu cognizance of contempt of subordinate courts under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and dismissed the appeal. The case was remanded to the High Court for further proceedings.
|
