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Issues Involved:
1. Personal requirement for eviction under s.21(1)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. Interpretation of the term 'occupation' in Explanation (iv) to s.21(1)(b). 3. Retrospective application of the 1976 Amendment Act deleting Explanation (iv). 4. Determination of whether the premises constituted a single unit or separate units. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Personal Requirement for Eviction: The appellant, a retired Judicial Officer, sought eviction of respondent No.3 from a portion of his house under s.21(1)(b) of the 1972 Act, claiming personal necessity to occupy the entire house post-retirement. The respondent contested the eviction on grounds that the appellant was living with his son and had sufficient accommodation in the retained portion of the house. The Prescribed Authority and the High Court ruled in favor of the appellant, recognizing his bona fide need for the entire house. 2. Interpretation of 'Occupation': The crux of the matter centered on the interpretation of 'occupation' in Explanation (iv) to s.21(1)(b). The respondent argued that the appellant was not in actual occupation of the retained portion, thus failing to meet the requirements of Explanation (iv). However, the court referred to a precedent (Babu Singh Chauhan v. Rajkumari Jain & Ors.), which established that possession by a landlord could include various forms, such as keeping household effects in the premises. The court concluded that even if the appellant made casual visits and retained control over the property, he would be deemed to be in occupation under Explanation (iv). 3. Retrospective Application of the 1976 Amendment Act: The respondent argued that the deletion of Explanation (iv) by the 1976 Amendment Act should apply retrospectively, negating the appellant's right to eviction. The court rejected this argument, stating that Explanation (iv) conferred a substantive right to the landlord, which could not be taken away by a procedural amendment unless explicitly stated. The court emphasized that the 1976 Amendment Act did not indicate any retrospective application. 4. Single Unit or Separate Units: In Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1979, the issue was whether the premises constituted a single unit or separate units. The trial court, based on the Commissioner's report, concluded that the entire building was a single unit. Consequently, the appellant, being in occupation of a portion, was entitled to the release of the entire premises. The court ordered the release of the entire portion in favor of the appellant. Judgment: The appeals were allowed, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts. The court ordered the release of the entire premises to the appellant, granting the respondent time to vacate by specified dates, subject to the usual undertaking. The court emphasized that a tenant has no right to dictate how a landlord should use or occupy their property. The judgment affirmed the substantive right of landlords to reclaim their property under the provisions of the 1972 Act, as interpreted in light of the 1976 Amendment Act.
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