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Issues:
1. Constitutional validity of bye-law No. 2 made by the District Board, Muzaffarnagar, U. P. 2. Infringement of the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Detailed Analysis: The judgment in question pertains to a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of bye-law No. 2 made by the District Board, Muzaffarnagar, U. P., which prohibits the establishment or maintenance of any cattle market within the jurisdiction of the Board. The petitioner, a tenant in the area, holds a market for the sale of cattle and charges commission for the same. The District Board issued a notice to the petitioner and his partner to cease holding the market, citing the aforementioned bye-law. The key issue at hand is whether this bye-law exceeds the powers of the District Board and violates the petitioner's fundamental right to carry on his business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The analysis delves into the relevant legal provisions, particularly Section 174 of the U. P. District Board Act, 1922, which empowers the Board to make bye-laws for the promotion of health, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants within its jurisdiction. Sub-section 2(1) of Section 174 specifically allows the Board to make bye-laws regulating markets among other public institutions. However, the judgment highlights that the impugned bye-law goes beyond regulation and outright prohibits the petitioner from holding the market, thereby infringing upon his fundamental right to carry on his business. Drawing a parallel to a previous case involving a similar bye-law by the Municipal Board, Kairana, the judgment emphasizes the importance of upholding the fundamental rights of individuals under Article 19(1)(g). In the Kairana case, the Supreme Court held that restrictions imposed by bye-laws must be reasonable and not absolute, especially when it comes to economic activities. The Court in the present case, after a thorough analysis, concludes that bye-law No. 2 is void as it contravenes the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court sets aside the bye-law and orders costs to be paid by the respondent to the petitioner. In summary, the judgment underscores the need for bye-laws to be within the scope of the authority granted to the governing bodies and stresses the protection of fundamental rights, particularly in matters concerning economic activities and businesses. The decision reaffirms the principle that restrictions on such rights must be reasonable and not unduly prohibitive, ensuring a balance between public interest and individual liberties.
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