2004 (2) TMI 686 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the notice issued by the appellant-Corporation to the workmen to rejoin duties did not sufficiently comply with the principles of natural justice and that individual notices were required to be given to each of the workmen? the illegal strike cannot amount to abandonment of service for the purpose of Clause L-2.12 of the Standing Orders(CSO)?

Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the writ petition.
2. Alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act.
3. Interpretation and application of Certified Standing Orders (CSO) L-2.12.
4. Nature of the workmen's absence (strike vs. unauthorized absence).
5. Principles of natural justice in termination procedures.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of the Writ Petition:

The High Court entertained the writ petition despite the appellant's objections. The appellant argued that the writ petition was not maintainable as the Corporation was not a State under Article 12 and that an unregistered union did not have the locus to represent the workmen. These points were not raised before the Supreme Court. The High Court exercised its discretion under Article 226, reasoning that the case did not involve disputed questions of fact and significant time had lapsed since the writ petition was filed in 1995. The Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition, emphasizing that the dispute was an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act and should have been adjudicated under the Act.

2. Alternative Remedy Under the Industrial Disputes Act:

The Supreme Court reiterated that when a dispute involves the enforcement of rights or obligations under the Industrial Disputes Act, the proper forum is the one provided under the Act. The Court cited *The Premier Automobiles Ltd. V. Kemlekar Shantaram Wadke* to emphasize that the Industrial Disputes Act provides a "speedy, inexpensive and effective forum" for resolving such disputes. The High Court should not have deviated from this principle, even though there was a delay in resolving the dispute.

3. Interpretation and Application of Certified Standing Orders (CSO) L-2.12:

CSO L-2.12 states that any workman absent without leave for more than 10 consecutive days is deemed to have left the service voluntarily. The High Court held that absence due to a strike did not amount to abandonment of service under CSO L-2.12. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that an illegal strike is not "authorized absence" and thus falls under unauthorized absence as per CSO L-2.12. The Court emphasized that the presumption of abandonment under CSO L-2.12 needed to be rebutted by the employee through evidence.

4. Nature of the Workmen's Absence (Strike vs. Unauthorized Absence):

The High Court concluded that the absence was due to a strike, which did not constitute abandonment of service. The Supreme Court found that the High Court incorrectly applied Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, instead of the relevant UP Industrial Disputes Act (UPIDA), which requires a notice of strike. The Court highlighted that there was no conclusive evidence that the workmen were on strike, and the issue needed factual determination.

5. Principles of Natural Justice in Termination Procedures:

The High Court held that the termination violated principles of natural justice as no inquiry was conducted. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant-Corporation had issued notices calling upon the workmen to return to duty, which the workmen did not respond to. The Court found that the notices complied with the principles of natural justice, and the presumption of abandonment under CSO L-2.12 was correctly drawn by the Management.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, emphasizing the need for the dispute to be resolved through the appropriate industrial dispute mechanisms. The Court allowed the appeals without costs, but clarified that the respondent-Union could still raise an industrial dispute under the UPIDA if entitled.

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