2015 (8) TMI 1258 - HC - Central Excise

Direction to make pre-deposits - Held that - In the facts of the present case, the Tribunal after erroneously recording that the petitioners had indulged in delaying the adjudication proceedings, has directed to deposit a sum of ₹ 20,00,000/- which is clearly discriminatory. In the aforesaid premises, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal being based upon an erroneous finding of fact as well as being discriminatory qua other assessees, cannot be sustained to the extent the same directs the petitioners to deposit ₹ 20,00,000/- and report compliance to the adjudicating authority. For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated 5th February, 2014 passed by the Tribunal (Annexure A to the petition) is hereby quashed and set aside, to the extent the same directs the main appellant therein to deposit an amount of ₹ 20,00,000/- within a period of eight weeks and report compliance to the adjudicating authority and further observes that upon verification of payment of such deposit, the adjudicating authority will decide the case afresh in de novo adjudication. Accordingly, the adjudicating authority shall decide the case afresh, de novo, after providing all relied upon documents to the petitioners and after extending them an opportunity of personal hearing.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the Tribunal's direction for the petitioners to deposit Rs. 20,00,000/- as a condition for de novo adjudication.
2. Alleged delay in adjudication proceedings attributed to the petitioners.
3. Discriminatory treatment compared to a similar case (Siddhi Vinayak Silk Mills).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legitimacy of the Tribunal's direction for the petitioners to deposit Rs. 20,00,000/-:
The petitioners challenged the Tribunal's order directing them to deposit Rs. 20,00,000/- within eight weeks as a condition for the adjudicating authority to decide the case afresh. The Tribunal had initially allowed the stay application, waiving pre-deposit of duties, interest, and penalty, but later imposed the deposit condition while remanding the matter for de novo adjudication. The court found this contradictory because the Tribunal had already waived the pre-deposit under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, indicating merit in the appeal. Thus, the direction for pre-deposit was deemed unnecessary and contradictory.

2. Alleged delay in adjudication proceedings attributed to the petitioners:
The Tribunal's finding that the petitioners delayed the adjudication proceedings was based on an erroneous interpretation of the facts. The show cause notice was issued on 31st January 2006 and served on 9th March 2006. The petitioners sought copies of relied upon documents on 19th April 2006. The matter was transferred to the call book on 31st July 2006 and remained there until 12th January 2012. The adjudicating authority issued a hearing notice on 29th January 2013 and passed the order-in-original on 18th March 2013. The court observed that the delay was due to the authorities transferring the case to the call book and not due to any default by the petitioners.

3. Discriminatory treatment compared to a similar case (Siddhi Vinayak Silk Mills):
In a similar case (Siddhi Vinayak Silk Mills), the Tribunal had remanded the matter without any pre-deposit condition. The court noted that the facts of both cases were similar, as both involved applications for documents around the same period. However, the Tribunal imposed a pre-deposit condition on the petitioners while not doing so in the Siddhi Vinayak Silk Mills case. This discrepancy was deemed discriminatory. The court held that the Tribunal's order was based on an erroneous finding of fact and was discriminatory, thus unsustainable.

Conclusion:
The court quashed and set aside the Tribunal's order directing the petitioners to deposit Rs. 20,00,000/-. The adjudicating authority was directed to decide the case afresh, de novo, after providing all relied upon documents to the petitioners and affording them an opportunity for a personal hearing. The rule was made absolute to this extent, with no order as to costs.