2009 (1) TMI 889 - SC - Indian Laws

Right to speedy trail - callous and inordinate delay of 17 years in investigations and the trial - Demand of illegal gratification - offence punishable under Sections 161 (before its omission by Act 30/2001) 109 and 120B of the I.P.C. and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 - seeking to quash the entire criminal proceedings pending against him - High Court dismissed the petition u/s 482 - Whether appellant s constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution are violated? - HELD THAT - We are of the opinion that having regard to the factual scenario noted above and for the reasons stated hereafter it is a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. (In particular Sections 197 173 309 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India Anr. 1978 (1) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT in Hussainara Khatoon Ors. Vs. Home Secretary State of Bihar 1979 (2) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT this Court had observed that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be reasonable fair and just ; and therefrom flows without doubt the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21 . The Court clarified that speedy trial means (reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. It is pertinent to note that even till date learned counsel for the State is not sure whether a sanction for prosecuting the appellant is required and if so whether it has been granted or not. We have no hesitation in holding that at least for the period from 7th December 1990 till 28th February 2007 there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay in investigation. Even the direction issued by the High Court seems to have had no effect on the prosecution and they slept over the matter for almost seventeen years. Nothing could be pointed out by the State far from being established to show that the delay in investigation or trial was in any way attributable to the appellant. The prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning a callous and inordinate delay of more than two decades in investigations and the trial. The said delay cannot in any way be said to be arising from any default on the part of the appellant. Thus on facts in hand in our opinion the stated delay clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. We feel that under these circumstances further continuance of criminal proceedings pending against the appellant in the court of Special Judge Muzaffarpur is unwarranted and despite the fact that allegations against him are quite serious they deserve to be quashed. Consequently the appeal is allowed and the proceedings pending against the appellant in Special Case are hereby quashed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the investigating officer.
2. Right to speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
3. Delay in investigation and trial process.
4. Exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the High Court.
5. Requirement and status of sanction for prosecution.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Investigating Officer:
The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the Inspector of Police who conducted the initial investigation, leading to the filing of a charge sheet on 28th February 1982. The High Court accepted this challenge and quashed the Magistrate's order taking cognizance, directing that the investigation be completed by an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or any other duly authorized officer within three months.

2. Right to Speedy Investigation and Trial under Article 21 of the Constitution:
The appellant argued that the prolonged delay of about twenty-eight years since the registration of the case deprived him of his constitutional right to a speedy investigation and trial as guaranteed under Article 21. The Supreme Court reiterated that the right to a speedy trial is an inalienable right under Article 21, encompassing all stages of criminal prosecution including investigation.

3. Delay in Investigation and Trial Process:
The Supreme Court noted the substantial delay in the investigation and trial process. After the High Court's order in 1990, no progress was made until 2007 when the Deputy Superintendent of Police was directed to complete the investigation. The fresh charge sheet was filed on 1st May 2007. The Court highlighted that there was no explanation for the delay from 7th December 1990 to 28th February 2007, and the prosecution failed to justify this delay.

4. Exercise of Inherent Powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the High Court:
The Supreme Court discussed the parameters under which the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The Court emphasized that these powers must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. The Court concluded that the High Court should have exercised its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. given the factual scenario and the inordinate delay in the case.

5. Requirement and Status of Sanction for Prosecution:
The Supreme Court observed that even at the time of the hearing, it was unclear whether the requisite sanction for prosecuting the appellant had been granted. The Court noted the lack of clarity and direction from the State regarding the sanction, further contributing to the delay and uncertainty in the proceedings.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the appellant's constitutional right to a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 had been violated due to the inordinate and unexplained delay of over two decades. The Court found that the delay was not attributable to the appellant and that the prosecution failed to show any exceptional circumstances to justify the delay. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant in Special Case No. 29 of 1987.