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Issues:
1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in directing de novo assessment and examining the claim of the assessee? 2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in upholding the directions for substantive assessment in the hands of the transferee-assessee? 3. Whether a reference can be claimed on the ground of a pending case in the Supreme Court? Analysis: The judgment pertains to reference applications filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax seeking direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer common questions of law. The factual background involves a public charitable trust transferring properties to another trust, with disputes arising regarding the validity of the transfer. The Commissioner sought reference on two questions of law related to the Tribunal's decisions on de novo assessment and substantive assessment. The Tribunal had dismissed the applications based on a previous decision involving Princess Usha Trust. The key issue for consideration was whether a reference could be claimed due to a pending case in the Supreme Court challenging a previous decision. The non-applicant contended that an appeal to the apex court did not warrant a reference, citing precedents such as CWT v. Smt. Usha Devi [1990] 183 ITR 75 (MP). The court referred to previous judgments, including CWT v. Princess Usha Trust [1989] 177 ITR 244, to establish that a pending matter before the Supreme Court was not a valid ground for directing a reference. It was emphasized that if a point of controversy had been decided in favor of the assessee and followed by the Tribunal, no referable question arose. The court rejected the reference applications based on the settled position in law and previous decisions, supporting the contentions of the non-applicant. The applicant's counsel, in the interest of the Revenue, requested liberty for the Tribunal to rectify any mistake if the basis of the Tribunal's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, invoking section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act. Consequently, the court rejected the reference applications as inutile and futile, granting liberty to the Tribunal to invoke section 254(2) if required. The order was to be retained in the case record, with a provision for counsel's fee on each side. The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the legal principles involved in seeking references based on pending cases and the authority of the Tribunal to rectify decisions in light of subsequent developments.
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