2012 (5) TMI 731 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether on a complaint made to the Copyright Board under Section 31 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the said Board under Clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) can pass an interim order in the pending complaint - Held that - In the instant case, the power being sought to be attributed to the Copyright Board involves the grant of the final relief, which is the only relief contemplated under Section 31 of the Copyright Act. Even in matters under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an interim relief granting the final relief should be given after exercise of great caution and in rare and exceptional cases. In the instant case, such a power is not even vested in the Copyright Board and hence the question of granting interim relief by grant of an interim compulsory licence cannot, in our view, arise. Mr. Salve s submission that the substratum of the scheme of Section 31 is commercial in nature and only involves computation of the charges to be paid to the holder of the copyright who withholds the same from the public, is no answer to the proposition that under Section 31 only an ultimate relief by way of grant of a licence on payment of reasonable charges to the copyright owner to publish and/or broadcast the work could be given. To grant an interim compulsory licence during the stay of the proceedings would amount to granting the final relief at the interim stage, although the power to grant such relief has not been vested in the Board. It is no doubt true, that Tribunals discharging quasi-judicial functions and having the trappings of a Court, are generally considered to be vested with incidental and ancillary powers to discharge their functions, but that cannot surely mean that in the absence of any provision to the contrary, such Tribunal would have the power to grant at the interim stage the final relief which it could grant. Such incidental powers could at best be said to exist in order to preserve the status-quo, but not to alter the same, as will no doubt happen, if an interim compulsory licence is granted. If the legislature had intended that the Copyright Board should have powers to grant mandatory injunction at the interim stage, it would have vested the Board with such authority. The submission made that there is no bar to grant such interim relief in Section 31 has to be rejected since the presence of a power cannot be inferred from the absence thereof in the Statute itself. Appeal allowed.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Copyright Board under Section 31 of the Copyright Act, 1957, can pass an interim order in a pending complaint.
2. The power of the Copyright Board to grant interim compulsory licenses.
3. The statutory and inherent powers of the Copyright Board.
4. The implications and limitations of statutory tribunals in granting interim relief.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the Copyright Board under Section 31 of the Copyright Act, 1957, can pass an interim order in a pending complaint:
The Supreme Court examined if the Copyright Board could pass an interim order under Section 31 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Section 31 allows the Board to grant compulsory licenses if the copyright owner refuses to publish or republish the work or allow its performance in public. The Court noted that the language of Section 31 does not explicitly provide for interim orders, indicating that the Board is only empowered to make final orders after a hearing and inquiry.

2. The power of the Copyright Board to grant interim compulsory licenses:
The Court reviewed the Delhi High Court's decision, which held that the Copyright Board had the power to issue interim compulsory licenses. The High Court's rationale was that the power to grant interim relief is a common law principle and not dependent on specific statutory empowerment. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the Board, being a statutory creation, can only exercise powers explicitly granted by the statute. The Court held that granting an interim compulsory license would be akin to granting final relief at the interim stage, which is not permissible.

3. The statutory and inherent powers of the Copyright Board:
The Court discussed the nature of the powers conferred on the Copyright Board under the Copyright Act. It was argued that the Board, being a quasi-judicial body, should have inherent powers to grant interim relief to preserve the status quo. However, the Court reiterated that tribunals and statutory bodies could only exercise powers expressly conferred by the statute. The Court cited several precedents, including *Rajeev Hitendra Pathak & Ors. Vs. Achyut Kashinath Karekar & Anr.*, where it was held that statutory bodies do not have inherent powers unless explicitly provided by the statute.

4. The implications and limitations of statutory tribunals in granting interim relief:
The Court examined various judgments to determine if tribunals could grant interim relief in the absence of express statutory provision. It referred to the decision in *Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund Vs. Kartick Das*, where it was held that the Consumer Protection Act did not confer the power to grant interim relief. The Court also considered the doctrine of implied powers but concluded that such powers could not be inferred to grant interim relief that effectively provides the final relief sought in the complaint.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Delhi High Court's judgment and order. It concluded that the Copyright Board does not have the power to grant interim compulsory licenses under Section 31 of the Copyright Act, as such power is not explicitly provided by the statute. The Court emphasized that statutory bodies could only exercise powers expressly conferred by their governing statutes, and any implied powers must be consistent with the legislative intent and statutory framework.

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