9911796707
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Issues:
1. Validity of notice under section 34(1)(A) of the Income-tax Act. 2. Preliminary objection regarding the filing of the petition by a dissolved firm through one ex-partner. 3. Classification of returns as loss returns under section 22(2A) and their impact on the applicability of section 22(3). 4. Determination of whether the returns were filed before an assessment was made, affecting the validity of notices under section 34. Analysis: 1. The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash a notice dated March 28, 1960, issued under section 34(1)(A) of the Income-tax Act for the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55. The petitioner had previously filed returns after assessments were completed, but those assessments were later canceled by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal due to improper service of notices under section 22(2). The petitioner argued that the subsequent notices under section 34 were invalid based on the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas [1959] 36 I.T.R. 569. 2. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the filing of the petition by a dissolved firm through only one ex-partner. The Income-tax department contended that the petition should have been filed by all partners of the dissolved firm. However, since the notices were served only on one ex-partner through whom the petition was filed, the court held that the non-joinder of all partners was not fatal to the petition's validity under article 226. 3. The issue of whether the returns filed by the petitioner should be considered as loss returns under section 22(2A) was raised. The court rejected this argument, stating that returns filed voluntarily by the assessee, even if they are loss returns, are considered returns under section 22(3) if filed before an assessment is made. The court emphasized that the distinction between income returns and loss returns does not affect the applicability of section 22(3) in such cases. 4. The court determined that since the assessments were canceled by the Tribunal, the returns filed by the petitioner were considered as filed before any assessment was made. As a result, the provisions of section 34 were deemed inapplicable, and the subsequent notices under that section were held to be invalid. The court allowed the petition, quashed the notices under section 34(1)(A) for the relevant years, and awarded costs to the petitioner.
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