9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit for ejectment abated due to the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, 1964. 2. Whether the original defendant, after the termination of the tenancy, was a trespasser. 3. Whether the premises in question was a "building" under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. 4. Whether the legal representatives of the original defendant were entitled to statutory tenant protection. 5. Whether the decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the Division Bench was sustainable. Detailed Analysis: 1. Abatement of the Suit: The primary issue was whether the suit for ejectment abated due to the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, 1964. The court held that the suit abated on June 10, 1964, due to Section 3 of the Amending Act. This section directed that every proceeding in respect of any non-residential building pending before any court on the date of the publication of the Amending Act should abate if the building was previously exempt under clause (iii) of section 30 of the principal Act. The court concluded that the suit in question was indeed instituted on the ground that the building was exempt from the principal Act, and thus, it abated. 2. Status of the Original Defendant: The court examined whether the original defendant, after the termination of the tenancy, was a trespasser. The Division Bench had erroneously held that the original defendant was a trespasser. The Supreme Court clarified that the original defendant became a statutory tenant due to the abatement of the suit under the Amending Act. Therefore, he could not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act. 3. Definition of "Building": The court addressed whether the premises in question qualified as a "building" under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The Division Bench had held that the building was not a "building" within the meaning of section 2(2) of the principal Act because it was neither "let" nor "to be let" on June 10, 1964. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that a building which was the subject of a terminated lease and continued to be occupied by the tenant still qualified as a "building" under the Act. The definition of "tenant" in section 2(8) supported this view, as it included persons continuing in possession after the termination of tenancy. 4. Protection of Legal Representatives: The court evaluated whether the legal representatives of the original defendant were entitled to statutory tenant protection. The trial court and the Division Bench had treated the suit as a fresh one against the legal representatives after the death of the original defendant. The Supreme Court found this approach incorrect, as the suit had already abated on June 10, 1964. Consequently, the legal representatives could not be treated as new defendants in a fresh suit. The court held that the legal representatives were entitled to the same statutory protection as the original defendant. 5. Sustainability of the Decree: Finally, the court assessed the sustainability of the decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court concluded that the entire proceedings, including the amendment of the plaint and the addition of new parties, were without jurisdiction since the suit had abated on June 10, 1964. The court emphasized that parties could not confer jurisdiction on the court by consent or acquiescence when the law had taken it away. Therefore, the decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the Division Bench was unsustainable. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decrees passed by the trial court and the Division Bench, and disposed of the suit as having abated on June 10, 1964. The findings on issues relating to the claim of the plaintiff to get possession of the property from the legal representatives of the original defendant were set aside, with liberty reserved to the parties to agitate these questions in appropriate proceedings. The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout.
|
