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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority under Section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 2. Validity of Rule 268 of the Madras Vehicles Rules, 1940. 3. Compliance with procedural requirements under Rule 268. 4. Allegations of mala fides and bias by the Transport Authority and the District Collector. 5. Compatibility of Rule 268 with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority under Section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939: The appellant challenged the validity of the resolutions passed by the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) declaring the bus-stand unsuitable and altering the starting and terminal points. The appellant argued that Section 76 did not authorize the RTA to close the bus-stand. The High Court held that Section 76 deals with parking places and halting stations and does not apply to a permanent bus-stand, which is a radiating center of bus traffic. Consequently, the RTA could not fix starting and terminus places for motor buses under Section 76. 2. Validity of Rule 268 of the Madras Vehicles Rules, 1940: The appellant contended that Rule 268, as amended, was ultra vires because it exceeded the rule-making power conferred by Section 68(2)(r) of the Motor Vehicles Act and was repugnant to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The court held that Rule 268 was within the scope of the powers conferred under Section 68 of the Act. Section 68(1) empowers the Provincial Government to make rules for carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV, which deals with the control of transport vehicles. The court found that the fixing or alteration of bus-stands was within the purpose of Chapter IV. 3. Compliance with procedural requirements under Rule 268: The appellant argued that Rule 268 was not complied with as the RTA must consult with other authorities before passing such an order. The court found that the RTA had consulted the Municipality, which was a proper authority in the circumstances. The consultation was deemed sufficient, and the rule was fully complied with. The court noted that the consultation requirement was discretionary, not obligatory. 4. Allegations of mala fides and bias by the Transport Authority and the District Collector: The appellant alleged that the actions of the Municipality and the District Collector were mala fide. The court found no material evidence to support the claim of mala fides. The mere fact that the grounds in the first notice were not adhered to in the second notice did not indicate mala fides. The court also dismissed the contention that the District Collector was biased because he had opened the new Municipal bus-stand. The court held that the District Collector was acting in his executive capacity, and his actions did not affect the validity or fairness of the order. 5. Compatibility of Rule 268 with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution: The appellant argued that Rule 268 was repugnant to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business. The court held that the appellant was not prohibited from running a bus-stand but was restricted from using the particular site for picking up or setting down passengers for outstation journeys. The restriction was deemed reasonable and in the interest of public convenience. The court emphasized that there is no fundamental right to carry on business at any location of one's choice, and such rights are subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the executive authority. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal with costs. The court affirmed the validity of Rule 268, the jurisdiction of the RTA under Section 68, and the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed. The allegations of mala fides and bias were found to be unsubstantiated. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.
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