2015 (1) TMI 1340 - SC - Indian Laws

Dismiss or terminate the services of a workman - power exercised by Labor court - Held that - It is a settled proposition of law that while considering the management s decision to dismiss or terminate the services of a workman, the Labour Court can interfere with the decision of the management only when it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Considering the delay in completing the enquiry and the age of the appellant and the fact that similarly situated workmen were reinstated with lesser punishment, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement, in exercise of its discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is set aside and the award passed by the Labour Court is restored

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the appellant's dismissal from service.
2. Delay in the disciplinary proceedings.
3. Discrimination in the punishment imposed.
4. High Court's interference with the Labour Court's award.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the appellant's dismissal from service:
The appellant, employed as a Driver in the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation since 1985, was dismissed from service in 2004 on the grounds of securing his appointment using a false transfer certificate. The Enquiry Officer found him guilty of misconduct in 2002, and the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal.

2. Delay in the disciplinary proceedings:
The charges against the appellant were framed in 1990, and the enquiry was initiated in 1992. However, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report only in 2002, and the dismissal order was passed in 2004, resulting in a twelve-year delay. The Labour Court noted the absence of a reasonable explanation for this inordinate delay, emphasizing that the appellant continued working for fourteen years during the proceedings and had reached an age where seeking alternative employment was impractical.

3. Discrimination in the punishment imposed:
The Labour Court observed that other workmen guilty of similar misconduct were reinstated with minor punishments, such as withholding a few annual increments. The appellant, however, faced the severe punishment of dismissal, which the Labour Court deemed discriminatory. Referring to Exs. W.5 to W.11, the Labour Court found that similarly situated workmen received lesser punishments and thus directed the appellant's reinstatement without backwages, modifying the punishment to withholding four annual increments with cumulative effect.

4. High Court's interference with the Labour Court's award:
The respondent-corporation's writ petition led the High Court to set aside the Labour Court's award, holding that the dismissal was proportionate to the appellant's misconduct. The Division Bench upheld this view, emphasizing the seriousness of the charges. However, the Supreme Court noted that the Labour Court's discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act was exercised judiciously, considering the delay and the appellant's age. The Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court should interfere with the Labour Court's award only in cases of patent perversity or gross miscarriage of justice. Citing precedents like Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd., the Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 should not be used to reappreciate evidence or act as an appellate court.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Labour Court's award. The Labour Court's decision to reinstate the appellant, considering the delay and discriminatory treatment, was upheld. The Supreme Court emphasized the limited scope of High Court interference in such matters, ensuring that social welfare legislations are interpreted in line with constitutional goals.