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Issues Involved:
1. Ultra vires of Section 33(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act under the Government of India Act, 1935. 2. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by Section 33(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Ultra vires of Section 33(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act under the Government of India Act, 1935: The petitioner contended that Section 33(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, which mandated a fee of Rs. 100 for filing an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, was ultra vires the Central Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935. The argument was based on Item 59 in List 1 of the Federal Legislative List, which allowed the Dominion Legislature to legislate on "Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not including fees taken in any Court." The crux of the argument was whether the Appellate Tribunal could be considered a "Court." If it were a Court, the Federal Legislature would not have the power to enact the impugned section. The judgment analyzed the definition of "Court" and concluded that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal did not qualify as a Court. Despite having some powers similar to those of a Court, such as enforcing attendance and examining witnesses on oath, the Tribunal's proceedings were not public, and it did not follow the same procedures as a Court. The Tribunal was deemed an administrative body with quasi-judicial functions, not a judicial tribunal or Court. Consequently, the Central Legislature had the power to levy the fee under Section 33(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act. 2. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India by Section 33(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act: The petitioner argued that Section 33(3) violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. The contention was that the section discriminated against assessees by requiring them to pay a fee for filing an appeal, whereas the Commissioner of Income-tax was not subjected to the same requirement. The judgment held that Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification. The classification between assessees and the Commissioner was deemed reasonable and related to the purpose of the legislation. The Commissioner represented the Government and was not an assessee. The distinction was not arbitrary but based on the different roles and responsibilities of the parties involved. Therefore, Section 33(3) did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Conclusion: The petition was dismissed on both grounds. The court held that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not a Court, and thus, the Central Legislature had the power to levy the fee. Additionally, the classification under Section 33(3) was reasonable and did not violate the principle of equality before the law under Article 14. The petitioner's grievance, although genuine, did not warrant relief as the issue was agitated for public benefit and not to vindicate a private right. The petition was dismissed without costs.
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