2008 (3) TMI 732 - HC - Indian Laws

Application for condonation of delay - unexplained period leading up to the issuance of the letter by the administrator pendente lite - revocation of the grant of probate was not made earlier - APL (Administrator Pendente Lite) powers - petitioner s attempt at reopening a challenge that had been scoffed at in the earlier proceedings - legatees insist that Sharad and the petitioner is but the same person and refer to a document that the petitioner has relied upon to show that notwithstanding the petitioner s feigned ignorance of all matters relating to Kamal Mitra s Will prior to receipt of the first letter issued by the administrator pendente lite, in the petitioner s acknowledgement in a declaration furnished to a statutory authority that Sharad was one of its key personnel there is admission of Sharad and the petitioner company being one and the same. HELD THAT - If the delay in the petitioner applying for revocation of the probate is condoned, and the petitioner s apparent right to seek revocation is recognised, the entire process that culminated in the conclusion of the lis by the Supreme Court order would be undone and reopened for fresh adjudication. The matter is not, as the petitioner simplifies and puts it, of the court being liberal in the matter of condonation of delay to allow a right to be canvassed. Equally, the principal issue is not, as the legatees suggest, to affix the petitioner with the knowledge that Sharad had and to consequently find the petitioner s explanation of the delay to be unmeritorious. Sharad may not have had any legal duty to inform the company (if the company was any more different from himself) upon discovering, although in his capacity as executor, that Reba Mitra had acquired no right to the estate to transfer it to the petitioner. Yet it was so overwhelming a moral duty that a director of a company in Sharad s place had, even if he were not its controlling shareholder, to inform the company of its imminent loss of its valuable asset, that the fine distinction between a legal duty and a moral duty vanishes. That Sharad had produced and relied upon the petitioner s lease to assert that notwithstanding Kamal Mitra s Will his estate passed to his widow, would also show that Sharad was aware that he was also fighting his company s cause. To ignore all that has gone on before and to accept the petitioner s simple case and apparent innocence would lead to gross injustice and undoing the finality that is attached to the result on the substance of the dispute following the Supreme Court verdict. The result is that the petitioner s application for condonation of delay fails as the petitioner is deemed to have had notice for a period much prior to the receipt of the administrator pendente lite s first letter of August 28, 2007 which the petitioner has chosen to ignore for want of any plausible explanation. As a consequence, the petitioner s application for revocation of the grant is not taken on board, but even if it were it would have to be dismissed for the only issue therein having been decided in favour of the legatees in the earlier proceedings. The petitioner will pay costs assessed at 2000 GMs. Urgent certified photostat copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Application for condonation of delay.
2. Petitioner's locus standi to seek revocation of the grant of probate.
3. Allegations of abuse of process by the petitioner.
4. Impact of previous judgments on the current proceedings.
5. Doctrine of lifting the corporate veil.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Application for Condonation of Delay:
The court addressed the petitioner's application for condonation of delay, which was filed as an afterthought and by way of abundant caution. The petitioner argued that the delay should be condoned as it only became aware of the Will of Kamal Kumar Mitra upon receiving letters from the administrator pendente lite in August and September 2007. The petitioner cited Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, asserting that the application for revocation of the grant was made within the permissible time frame. However, the court found that the petitioner had knowledge of the Will and the probate proceedings much earlier, particularly through the involvement of Sharad Subramanyan, who was closely associated with the petitioner company.

2. Petitioner's Locus Standi to Seek Revocation of the Grant of Probate:
The petitioner claimed to have a caveatable interest under Section 283 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, as a transferee of property from the intestate heir, and thus, the right to seek revocation of the grant under Section 263 of the Act. The court examined several precedents, including judgments from the Bombay High Court and Calcutta High Court, to determine whether the petitioner had the locus standi to maintain the proceedings. The court acknowledged that a transferee of property from an intestate heir might have the right to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration, but emphasized that this right needed to be assessed in the context of the petitioner's actual knowledge and involvement in previous litigation.

3. Allegations of Abuse of Process by the Petitioner:
The legatees argued that the petitioner's attempt to seek revocation of the grant was a scandalous abuse of process, intended to resurrect a dispute that had already been conclusively settled in their favor by the Supreme Court. They contended that Sharad Subramanyan, who was closely associated with the petitioner, had previously challenged Kamal Mitra's Will and failed. The legatees emphasized that Sharad's knowledge and involvement should be imputed to the petitioner, and that allowing the petitioner to relitigate the matter would be unjust and an abuse of the judicial process.

4. Impact of Previous Judgments on the Current Proceedings:
The court considered the impact of previous judgments, particularly the Supreme Court judgment in Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi Mazumdar, which had conclusively settled the dispute regarding Kamal Mitra's Will. The court noted that Sharad Subramanyan had fought the validity of the Will in earlier proceedings and had failed. Given the close association between Sharad and the petitioner, the court found that the petitioner's current challenge was essentially a re-litigation of the same issue. The court emphasized that the finality of the Supreme Court's judgment should not be undone by allowing the petitioner to proceed with its application for revocation.

5. Doctrine of Lifting the Corporate Veil:
The legatees urged the court to apply the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil to assess whether Sharad Subramanyan was the controlling mind behind the petitioner company. The court agreed that it was necessary to look beyond the corporate structure to determine the true nature of the petitioner's challenge. The court found that Sharad had a moral duty, if not a legal one, to inform the petitioner of the probate proceedings and the implications of Kamal Mitra's Will. The court concluded that Sharad's knowledge and actions should be imputed to the petitioner, and that ignoring this would lead to gross injustice.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petitioner's application for condonation of delay, finding that the petitioner had knowledge of the probate proceedings well before receiving the administrator pendente lite's letters in 2007. Consequently, the petitioner's application for revocation of the grant was not entertained. The court also emphasized that even if the application were considered, it would be dismissed on the grounds that the issue had already been conclusively decided in favor of the legatees by the Supreme Court. The petitioner was ordered to pay costs assessed at 2000 GMs.