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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit for partition was instituted for the benefit of the minor plaintiff. 2. Whether the suit for partition abated upon the death of the minor plaintiff before the court adjudicated on the matter. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the suit for partition was instituted for the benefit of the minor plaintiff. The appellants contended that the concurrent finding by the lower courts that the suit was not instituted for the benefit of the minor should not be reversed in second appeal. The High Court, however, found that the defendants had acted adversely to the minor by falsely claiming that items 2 and 11 were their separate properties and by alleging that the family had debts. The High Court concluded that the suit for partition was beneficial to the minor, as it was in his interest to separate from the defendants who were acting against his interests. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's finding, noting that the lower courts had misunderstood the real point for determination, which justified the High Court's interference in second appeal. 2. Whether the suit for partition abated upon the death of the minor plaintiff before the court adjudicated on the matter. The appellants argued that the suit abated because a minor cannot express a volition to become divided, and the court's decision on the benefit to the minor is necessary to effect a division in status. They contended that the minor died an undivided coparcener and his interest survived to the other coparceners. The respondents, however, argued that a suit for partition on behalf of a minor effects a severance in status from the date of the suit, conditional on the court finding it beneficial to the minor. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the right of a minor coparcener to call for partition and the court's power to decide on the benefit to the minor. It noted that under the Mitakshara law, a coparcener has the right to share in joint family properties from birth, and this includes the right to demand partition. The court held that when a suit for partition is instituted on behalf of a minor, it results in a severance in status from the date of the suit, subject to the court's decision on the benefit to the minor. The court rejected the view that the power to bring about a division rests solely with the court, stating that the court's role is to decide whether the next friend has acted in the minor's best interests. The court cited previous decisions supporting the view that a suit for partition on behalf of a minor does not abate upon the minor's death before trial, and that the legal representatives can continue the suit to establish the benefit to the minor. The court concluded that the action of the next friend in instituting the suit brings about a division in status, with the court's decree rendering it effective. It dismissed the argument that the cause of action for partition is personal to the minor and abates upon his death, noting that the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" does not apply to suits for partition, which are suits for property. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the suit for partition was instituted for the benefit of the minor and did not abate upon his death. The court ordered that the amounts paid by the appellants to the respondents be taken into account in adjusting the rights of the parties under the decree.
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