2010 (3) TMI 1217 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of proceedings before the Lokayukta, Delhi.
2. Legitimacy of the Lokayukta's inquiry in parallel with criminal proceedings.
3. Validity of the Lokayukta's interim recommendations and procedural orders.
4. Alleged violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights.
5. Interpretation of the term "affirmation" under Section 2(b)(i) of the DLAU Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Quashing of Proceedings Before the Lokayukta, Delhi:
The petitioner, an MLA, sought to quash the proceedings before the Lokayukta in Complaint No. C-236/Lok/2009, which included two orders dated 17th February 2010. The complaint was filed by a Superintending Engineer of the Delhi Jal Board, alleging that the petitioner barged into his office, shouted, and assaulted him. The petitioner denied the allegations and filed a reply and an application to dismiss the proceedings. The Lokayukta dismissed the application and set the procedure for inquiry, leading to the petitioner challenging these decisions in the High Court.

2. Legitimacy of the Lokayukta's Inquiry in Parallel with Criminal Proceedings:
The petitioner argued that the DLAU Act did not contemplate parallel inquiries by the Lokayukta and police, citing Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. The court noted that the DLAU Act allows inquiries into allegations even if they form the subject of criminal proceedings. The Act's provisions indicate that the Lokayukta's inquiry can proceed notwithstanding criminal investigations. The court found no merit in the argument that the Lokayukta should await the outcome of the criminal case, emphasizing that the Lokayukta's findings would not bind the criminal court.

3. Validity of the Lokayukta's Interim Recommendations and Procedural Orders:
The petitioner contended that the Lokayukta, having made an interim recommendation to the LG, should await the LG's response before proceeding. The court held that the Lokayukta could make multiple recommendations and proceed with the inquiry concurrently. The Lokayukta's actions were within his powers, and the complaint against the MLA for assaulting a public servant fell within the scope of Section 2(b)(i) of the DLAU Act. The court also upheld the Lokayukta's discretion to set the inquiry procedure, finding it consistent with the Act and natural justice principles.

4. Alleged Violation of the Petitioner's Fundamental Rights:
The petitioner argued that the inquiry procedure would force him to disclose his defense, violating his Article 21 rights. The court rejected this, noting that civil and disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal proceedings. The Lokayukta's findings would not bind the criminal court, and the inquiry was essential to maintain administrative integrity. The court found no prejudice to the petitioner from the Lokayukta's procedure.

5. Interpretation of the Term "Affirmation" Under Section 2(b)(i) of the DLAU Act:
The petitioner argued that the complaint lacked "affirmation" as required by Section 2(b)(i). The court interpreted "affirmation" flexibly, consistent with the Act's purpose. The Lokayukta could devise a procedure where the complainant affirmed the allegations during the inquiry. The court emphasized a purposive interpretation to advance the Act's remedial objectives.

Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the Lokayukta's authority to proceed with the inquiry and rejecting the petitioner's challenges on all grounds. The court upheld the Lokayukta's procedural orders and interpretation of the DLAU Act, emphasizing the Act's purpose to ensure accountability of public functionaries.