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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the transaction evidenced by Ex. 1, dated March 20, 1915, was a family arrangement conferring title to a half share in the disputed house to the appellant and his father. 2. Whether such title became extinguished due to adverse possession by Baijnath for the statutory period. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Nature of Ex. 1 as a Family Arrangement 1. Background and Claims: - The appellant and his father filed a suit for a declaration of their half share in a disputed house. The respondents argued that the appellant and his father derived no interest under Ex. 1, relinquished any interest upon being paid, and lost any remaining interest due to adverse possession by the respondents. - The Trial Court and a learned Single Judge initially ruled in favor of the appellant, recognizing Ex. 1 as a family arrangement conferring a half share in the house to the appellant and his father. 2. Division Bench Ruling: - The Division Bench revisited the nature of Ex. 1 and concluded it was not a family arrangement. They reasoned that there were three sets of executants with no conflicting claims between Amar Singh and Nanhku, thus no mutuality or consideration for conferring a half share to Nanhku. - The Division Bench held that Ex. 1 was not executed to settle any existing or apprehended disputes and thus could not be considered a family arrangement. 3. Supreme Court Analysis: - The Supreme Court disagreed with the Division Bench's premises, emphasizing that a family arrangement does not require an enforceable legal claim. It can be based on the need to maintain family harmony or settle potential disputes. - The Court highlighted that Ex. 1 contained declarations acknowledging Nanhku's adoption and his entitlement to certain properties, indicating potential disputes and the need for a family arrangement. - The Supreme Court concluded that Ex. 1 was indeed a family arrangement, thus conferring a half share in the disputed house to Nanhku and the appellant. Issue 2: Adverse Possession 1. Legal Principles: - Adverse possession must be adequate, continuous, and exclusive. For co-sharers, possession by one is considered possession by all unless there is evidence of ouster, which requires an open assertion of hostile title and exclusive enjoyment. 2. Division Bench Findings: - The Division Bench found that Baijnath and Sonadhari's names were listed as sole owners in municipal records, and they paid taxes and repair costs without contributions from Nanhku. They concluded that Baijnath's adverse possession was continuous and exclusive, extinguishing Nanhku's title. 3. Supreme Court Analysis: - The Supreme Court found that occasional stays by Nanhku and his wife in the disputed house, along with the entry of Nanhku's name in the Municipal Survey Khasra, interrupted the continuity and exclusiveness of Baijnath's possession. - The Court noted that Baijnath's assertion of exclusive title in his 1933 written statement marked the commencement of adverse possession, but this was interrupted by Nanhku's acts of possession and the 1941 compromise application acknowledging joint residence. - The Supreme Court concluded that the adverse possession claim by Baijnath was not sustained due to interruptions by Nanhku's acts of possession. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's judgment and decree, and restored the Trial Court's decree recognizing the appellant's half share in the disputed house. The respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs throughout the proceedings.
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