1953 (11) TMI 20 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction to transfer contempt proceedings.
2. Applicability of Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code to contempt cases.
3. Inherent jurisdiction of courts of record to punish for contempt.
4. Historical and statutory basis of contempt jurisdiction in Indian High Courts.
5. Procedural fairness in contempt proceedings.
6. Transfer of cases involving personal attacks on judges.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction to Transfer Contempt Proceedings:
The application sought the transfer of contempt proceedings from the Pepsu High Court to another High Court or, alternatively, to prevent two named judges from hearing the matter. This raised the question of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to order such a transfer.

2. Applicability of Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code to Contempt Cases:
The applicant's counsel argued that Section 527, which authorizes the transfer of any "case" for the ends of justice, should apply to contempt proceedings. They contended that since contempt is punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, it constitutes an "offence" under Section 4(o) of the Criminal Procedure Code, making it triable under the Code. However, the Court disagreed, stating that the power of a High Court to institute and punish for contempt is a special jurisdiction inherent in all courts of record, excluded from the Criminal Procedure Code by Section 1(2).

3. Inherent Jurisdiction of Courts of Record to Punish for Contempt:
The judgment emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is inherent in every court of record. This has been a long-standing view in India, supported by historical precedents and statutory provisions. For instance, the Charter of 1774 and subsequent legislations like the High Courts Act of 1861 and the Government of India Act, 1915, recognized and continued these powers.

4. Historical and Statutory Basis of Contempt Jurisdiction in Indian High Courts:
The judgment traced the historical basis of contempt jurisdiction from the common law of England, as applied to the Chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, and its successor, the Act of 1952, recognized the existing jurisdiction of High Courts to punish for contempt, merely limiting the amount of punishment and resolving doubts about the power to punish for contempt of subordinate courts.

5. Procedural Fairness in Contempt Proceedings:
The Court noted that contempt proceedings are outside the purview of the Criminal Procedure Code. High Courts can deal with contempt summarily, provided the procedure is fair, and the contemner is made aware of the charge and given a fair opportunity to defend. This principle was affirmed by the Privy Council in In re Pollard and followed in subsequent Indian and Burmese cases.

6. Transfer of Cases Involving Personal Attacks on Judges:
While the Supreme Court held that it lacked the power to transfer contempt proceedings from one High Court to another or from one judge to another, it emphasized the importance of judicial impartiality. It suggested that judges personally attacked should ideally not hear contempt matters involving them, to maintain the appearance of justice being done. However, this should be left to the judges' discretion, considering practical constraints.

Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed as the Supreme Court found it incompetent to order the transfer of contempt proceedings or to prevent specific judges from hearing the case. The Court highlighted the inherent jurisdiction of High Courts to punish for contempt, the exclusion of such jurisdiction from the Criminal Procedure Code, and the necessity of maintaining procedural fairness in contempt proceedings. The judgment underscored the importance of judicial impartiality, particularly in cases involving personal attacks on judges.