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Issues Involved:
1. Whether there was in fact an adoption as alleged? 2. Whether there could in law be any such adoption? Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether there was in fact an adoption as alleged? The judgment begins by addressing the first issue, where both the trial Court and the first appellate Court have come to a concurrent finding that the factum of adoption has not been satisfactorily proved. The Deed of Adoption purported to record a sham transaction. The judgment emphasizes that even if this finding is considered grossly erroneous, a second appellate Court must fold its hands under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the finding is such that no Court could arrive at it based on the materials on record. The judgments of the lower courts demonstrate anxious advertence to all the materials on record, and their concurrent finding that the factum of adoption has not been proved is unassailable in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1976. 2. Whether there could in law be any such adoption? Although the first issue's resolution is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, the judgment proceeds to consider the second issue for completeness. The court discusses the historical and legal context of adoption under Hindu Law, noting that the Maharashtra School of Hindu Law allows a widow to adopt without her deceased husband's authority or the consent of her husband's Sapindas. However, the judgment points out that the power of a widow to adopt ceases if her pre-deceased son left a widow. This principle is well settled by judicial decisions spreading over more than a century. The judgment references several key cases, including the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramkrishna Ramchandra v. Shamrao, which ruled that the power of a widow to adopt is extinguished if her son dies leaving a widow, and this power does not revive even if the son's widow dies or remarries. This principle was affirmed by the Privy Council in cases like Madana Mohana v. Purushothama and Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh, and by the Supreme Court in Gurunath v. Kamalabai. The judgment also notes that the Bombay High Court has, in a series of decisions, held that the interposition of a son's widow would bring the mother's power to adopt to an end only when there was one son, but not when there was another son who died unmarried and without a son. However, the judgment expresses difficulty in appreciating this ratio, suggesting that the law laid down in these decisions may not be in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in Gurunath. Despite these observations, the judgment concludes that the appellate judge was bound to follow the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Sahebrao Madhavrao and Vaijoba, which had considered and distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Gurunath. The law declared by the High Court is binding on all courts in the State until outweighed by a later decision of the Supreme Court or a larger Bench of the High Court. Conclusion: The judgment ultimately dismisses the Second Appeal, affirming the findings of the lower courts that the alleged adoption did not take place in fact, and thus, the question of the widow mother's right to adopt need not be pursued further. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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