1962 (5) TMI 40 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878 under Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. Validity of prosecutions without sanction under Section 29.
3. Severability of Section 29 from Section 19 of the Act.
4. Definition of 'Arms' under Section 4(1) of the Act.
5. Alleged discrimination in prosecutions under Article 14.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Constitutionality of Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878 under Article 14 of the Constitution:
The primary issue was whether Section 29 of the Act is unconstitutional as it requires sanction for prosecution in some areas but not in others, potentially contravening Article 14, which ensures equality before the law. The Court examined the historical context of the legislation, noting that the differentiation originated from the political situation in 1857. However, the Court concluded that more than a century had passed, and the conditions had radically changed, rendering the differentiation irrelevant to the object of the legislation. Thus, the differentiation was held to be discriminatory and repugnant to Article 14.

2. Validity of Prosecutions Without Sanction Under Section 29:
The Court considered the implications of its finding that Section 29 is unconstitutional. Two questions arose: (i) whether the prosecutions in the instant cases were invalid for want of sanction, and (ii) if Section 29 is void in toto, whether Section 19 also becomes void and unenforceable. The Court referred to previous decisions, particularly noting that the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bhai Singh v. The State held that the entire Section 29 was void, making no sanction necessary for prosecutions under the Act.

3. Severability of Section 29 from Section 19 of the Act:
The Court examined whether the invalid portion of Section 29 could be severed, leaving the rest valid. It was argued that the requirement of sanction was severable from the rest of the section. However, the Court held that accepting this would defeat the clear intention of the legislature, which explicitly required no sanction for prosecutions in certain areas. Therefore, the entire Section 29 was held to be bad, but this did not affect the validity of Section 19, which remained enforceable.

4. Definition of 'Arms' under Section 4(1) of the Act:
In Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961, the appellant contended that the pistol found in his possession was not in a fit condition to be effectively used and thus did not fall within the definition of 'Arms' under Section 4(1) of the Act. The Court rejected this contention, affirming that the pistol did qualify as 'Arms' under the Act.

5. Alleged Discrimination in Prosecutions under Article 14:
In Criminal Appeal 62 of 1960, the appellant argued that the State had launched prosecutions under the Act, some with and others without sanction, constituting discrimination under Article 14. The Court found no substance in this contention and rejected it.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, upholding the convictions while clarifying the unconstitutionality of Section 29 in its entirety due to its discriminatory nature under Article 14. The prosecutions were deemed valid despite the lack of sanction, and Section 19 of the Act remained enforceable. The Court also confirmed the definition of 'Arms' under the Act and found no merit in the allegations of discriminatory prosecutions.