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Issues Involved:
1. Is the defendant a common carrier? 2. Can the destructive acts of an unruly mob be characterized as an act of God? Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Is the defendant a common carrier? The court first addressed whether the defendant qualifies as a common carrier. The plaintiff had booked 18 bags of green gram with the defendant, who was operating a lorry service. The goods were not delivered as agreed, leading to the suit for the price and interest. The defendant claimed the loss was due to an unruly mob's actions, which were beyond his control. The court noted that the term "common carrier" is defined in The Carriers Act of 1865, but this Act did not apply to the erstwhile Travancore State, where the incident occurred. In such cases, rules of justice, equity, and good conscience, often guided by English Common Law, were applied. The court examined various authoritative definitions of a common carrier, including those from Chitty on Contracts, Otto Khan-Freund's Treatise, and several judicial precedents. A common carrier is one who publicly professes to transport goods for hire for all persons indiscriminately. The court concluded that the defendant, operating a lorry service under a public carrier's permit as per the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, fits the definition of a common carrier. The public nature of the employment and the duty to serve the public without discrimination were emphasized. Issue 2: Can the destructive acts of an unruly mob be characterized as an act of God? The court then considered whether the loss caused by the unruly mob could be classified as an act of God, which would absolve the defendant of liability. The court clarified that the liability of a common carrier is akin to that of an insurer, responsible for the loss of goods unless caused by an act of God or the King's enemies. The court defined an act of God as arising from natural causes, such as storms or volcanic eruptions, which are beyond human control. It rejected the defendant's argument that all inevitable accidents, including those caused by human agency, should be considered acts of God. The court cited authoritative sources, including Cockburn C.J. in Nugent v. Smith and Halsbury's Laws of England, to support its stance that acts of God must be extraordinary natural occurrences without human intervention. The court found that the criminal activities of the mob, being acts of human agency, could not be classified as acts of God. Therefore, the defendant could not be absolved from the rule of absolute liability as a common carrier. Conclusion: The court dismissed the second appeal, holding that the defendant, as a common carrier, was liable for the loss of goods caused by the mob's actions. The judgment emphasized the defendant's absolute liability, except in cases of natural disasters or acts of the King's enemies, and awarded costs to the plaintiff.
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