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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the plaint-schedule house is the property of the joint family or built out of the self-acquisitions of Govindprasad. 2. Validity and authenticity of the relinquishment deeds and the trust deed. 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. 4. Whether the suit should be dismissed for not seeking further relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Property Ownership: The main issue was whether the house in question was joint family property or built from Govindprasad's self-acquisitions. The court noted the presumption in Hindu Law that a family is joint and that a division in status can be effected by a clear declaration. However, the burden of proving that the property is joint family property lies on the claimant. If sufficient joint family nucleus is proved, the burden shifts to the individual claiming it as personal property to show it was acquired without family assistance. The court found that the family had extensive properties and businesses, and there was no reliable evidence that Govindprasad had separate income to fund the house construction. The evidence showed that the family supervised the construction, paid contractors, and took receipts. Thus, the appellant failed to prove that the house was built from Govindprasad's self-acquisitions. 2. Validity of Relinquishment and Trust Deeds: The relinquishment deed dated January 24, 1898, was scrutinized. The court found discrepancies and concluded that the document was a sham, created after the death of Ajodhyaprasad, whose signature was forged. Similarly, the deed dated February 27, 1915, was found to be part of a scheme to defraud creditors, as it was executed on the same date as other fraudulent documents. The trust deed dated February 17, 1916, was also examined. The court found that the trust was abruptly dissolved, and the property continued to be treated as joint family property. The trustees were family agents, and the trust deed was part of the scheme to protect family assets from creditors. 3. Limitation: The appellant argued that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, as the plaintiff had knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the trust deed as early as 1917. The court held that the right to sue accrues when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to the plaintiff's right. The plaintiff's right was not effectively threatened until the Commissioner came to divide the property in 1937, and the suit was filed within six years thereafter, making it within time. 4. Further Relief under Specific Relief Act: The appellant contended that the suit should be dismissed for not seeking further relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The court noted that this plea was not raised in the written statement or before the District Judge. The High Court rejected the contention, stating that the plaintiff, being in possession of the joint family property, was not bound to ask for partition if he did not intend to separate from the family. The court held that this issue should have been raised earlier, allowing the plaintiff to amend the pleadings if necessary. Conclusion: The court concluded that the house was joint family property and the trust deed was a sham document. The suit was within the limitation period, and the plea under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act was not allowed. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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