1972 (5) TMI 72 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Dismissal of the suit for specific performance.
2. Decree for possession by pre-emption.
3. Compliance with Mahomedan Law regarding demands for pre-emption.
4. Validity of the demands made for pre-emption.
5. Enforceability of subsequent agreements in the presence of earlier agreements.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Dismissal of the suit for specific performance:
The appeals were brought by special leave from a common judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which maintained the dismissal of the suit for specific performance filed by the appellant. The High Court upheld the decree of dismissal in the suit for specific performance filed by the appellant, affirming that the preliminary condition specified in the agreement had not been satisfied. The agreement executed by Mussamat Chhoti Begum and her three sisters in favor of the respondent about getting the premises vacated from the tenant had not been satisfied, and therefore, the agreement had not lapsed. The appellant had no right to bring a suit for specific performance against Chhoti Begum by virtue of the subsequent agreement dated August 11, 1953.

2. Decree for possession by pre-emption:
The Allahabad High Court confirmed the decree for possession by pre-emption in favor of respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 had filed a suit for possession by pre-emption on the allegation that he had become a co-sharer with the other three daughters by virtue of the sale effected in his favor by Chhoti Begum of her share in the eastern portion of the house. The trial court held that respondent No. 1 was not a bona fide purchaser for value but since he had a right of pre-emption, the suit for specific performance was dismissed, and the suit relating to pre-emption was decreed in favor of respondent No. 1.

3. Compliance with Mahomedan Law regarding demands for pre-emption:
The appellant contended that under Mahomedan Law, no right of pre-emption accrues unless a demand for pre-emption is made after the completion of the sale of the property sought to be pre-empted. The court had to consider the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 and the Registration Act 1908. The appellant argued that the sale sought to be pre-empted could not be regarded as having been completed until October 8, 1953, when the sale deed was copied in the books of the Sub-Registrar. The demands made before this date were considered premature.

4. Validity of the demands made for pre-emption:
The trial court discussed the evidence and held that demands had been properly performed in accordance with law. The evidence related mainly to what happened on August 17, 1953, when the plaintiff was informed of the sale deed executed in favor of defendant No. 1. However, the appellant argued that the demands made were premature according to the decision in Ram Saran Lall's case, which stated that the demands must be made after the sale deed is copied in the Sub-Registrar's books. The High Court did not examine the question of demand in light of this decision, and the appellant did not raise this argument at that stage.

5. Enforceability of subsequent agreements in the presence of earlier agreements:
The first appellate court decided that the preliminary condition specified in the agreement executed by Mussamat Chhoti Begum and her three sisters in favor of the respondent about getting the premises vacated from the tenant had not been satisfied. Therefore, the agreement had not lapsed, and the respondent could have enforced that agreement. The appellant could not enforce the subsequent agreement dated August 11, 1953, in the presence of the earlier agreement dated August 19, 1952. The High Court affirmed this view, and the Supreme Court found no error in the judgment of the first appellate court or the High Court that would justify interference.

Conclusion:
Both appeals, arising out of the suit for pre-emption and the suit for specific performance, were dismissed. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout. The judgment emphasized the technical nature of Mahomedan Law relating to demands for pre-emption and the difficulty in complying with all requirements, suggesting that legislative intervention might be necessary.