1991 (6) TMI 253 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Application of the principle of Promissory Estoppel to compel the Government to acquire certain lands.
2. The Government's power to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
3. Whether the acquisition was tainted with malafides to favor certain individuals.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Application of the Principle of Promissory Estoppel:
The primary issue was whether the principle of Promissory Estoppel could be invoked to compel the Government to acquire lands. The appellant argued that since the Government had issued a Section 4(1) Notification and entered into an agreement for land acquisition, the principle of Promissory Estoppel should apply. The appellant relied on the decision in Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd., which held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its governmental, public, or executive functions. The appellant claimed that they had acted to their detriment by advancing money and entering into an agreement based on the Government's promise.

However, the court found that this decision was not applicable to the case at hand. The court emphasized that the power of the Government under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act to withdraw from acquisition proceedings cannot be curtailed by invoking the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. The court noted that the Land Acquisition Act provides clear terms under which the Government can withdraw from acquisition, specifically before possession is taken. Since no final declaration under Section 6 had been issued, the appellant could not claim that the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel applied. The court concluded that the appellant could seek the return of the Rs. 10.00 lakhs deposited but could not compel the Government to proceed with the acquisition under the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.

2. Government's Power to Withdraw from Acquisition:
The court examined Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which allows the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of any land before possession is taken. The court reiterated that this power is sovereign and cannot be restricted by the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. The court explained that the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) is administrative and does not confer any rights on the parties. Only after a statutory inquiry under Section 5A and a final declaration under Section 6 can the acquisition process proceed to the stage where possession is taken and the property vests with the Government. The court emphasized that the Government's power to withdraw is not absolute but is subject to statutory provisions, and in this case, the Government had not taken possession, nor had it issued a final declaration under Section 6. Therefore, the withdrawal was within the Government's rights under Section 48.

3. Allegation of Malafides:
The appellant alleged that the acquisition was tainted with malafides to favor certain individuals. The court referred to the decision in Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar, where the withdrawal of land acquisition was held to favor a few individuals. However, the court found that this decision did not support the appellant's case. The court did not find any evidence of malafides in the Government's decision to withdraw from the acquisition. The court concluded that the appellant's allegations of malafides were unfounded and did not affect the Government's right to withdraw under Section 48.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, concurring with the learned single judge that the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel does not apply to compel the Government to proceed with land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Government's power to withdraw from acquisition proceedings under Section 48 is sovereign and cannot be restricted by promissory estoppel. The allegations of malafides were also found to be without merit.