1961 (12) TMI 105 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the notification under Section 4 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 is ultra vires the Act.
2. Whether the Act itself is ultra vires the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Ultra Vires Notification
Contention of Petitioners:
The petitioners argued that the notification is ultra vires the Act because the Act applies only to "unworked" coal mines, which they interpret as virgin lands, and not to mines that are currently or were previously worked. They relied heavily on the preamble of the Act which states its purpose as the acquisition of "unworked land."

Court's Analysis:
The Court analyzed the preamble and the substantive provisions of the Act, emphasizing that while the preamble can be a guide, it should not override clear statutory language. The Court noted that the Act's language is broad and includes both virgin lands and dormant mines. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were scrutinized, and the Court found that the Act does not restrict its application to virgin lands alone. Specifically, Section 4(4) requires the exclusion of land where mining operations are currently carried out, implying that other lands, including those with dormant mines, are covered.

Conclusion:
The Court held that the notification under Section 4 is not ultra vires the Act. The Act applies to both virgin lands and dormant mines.

Issue 2: Ultra Vires the Constitution
Contention of Petitioners:
The petitioners argued that Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Act infringe on their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by depriving them of their right to carry on business without adequate compensation. They also contended that the Act does not provide compensation for the deprivation of their right to work the mines for two to three years.

Court's Analysis:
The Court acknowledged that while the Act does not provide specific compensation for the suspension of mining rights, Article 31A(1)(e) of the Constitution protects laws that modify or extinguish rights under mining leases. The Court referred to previous judgments to clarify that modification includes temporary suspension of rights. Moreover, the Court examined Section 13 of the Act, which deals with compensation and found that it specifies the principles for determining compensation, thus satisfying the requirements of Article 31(2) of the Constitution.

Conclusion:
The Court held that the Act is not ultra vires the Constitution. The provisions of Article 31A(1)(e) and Article 31(2) protect the Act, and the petitioners' challenge on these grounds fails.

Summary:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the notification under Section 4 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, is not ultra vires the Act, and the Act itself is not ultra vires the Constitution. The Act applies to both virgin lands and dormant mines, and the provisions for compensation meet constitutional requirements. The petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) are not violated as the temporary suspension of mining rights is considered a modification protected by Article 31A(1)(e). The petitions were dismissed with costs.