9911796707
|
Home
Issues:
1. Whether the petitioners, accused Nos. 6 and 7, should be quashed from the proceedings under sections 276CC and 278B(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 2. Whether the petitioners' contention of not being directors of the company is valid. 3. Whether the criminal trial should be stayed due to pending petitions for compounding the offences. Analysis: 1. The petitioners, accused Nos. 6 and 7, invoked the court's inherent powers under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings against them. The petitioners were accused in a case for offences under sections 276CC and 278B(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioners argued that they were not directors of the company and, therefore, should not be questioned under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court noted that the question of whether the petitioners were directors was a matter of fact to be determined by the trial court and not in the present proceedings. The court dismissed the petitioners' plea to quash the proceedings. 2. The petitioners contended that there was no satisfactory evidence proving they were directors of the company. They relied on the memorandum and articles of association to show they were not directors. However, the court found that the evidence presented by the Income-tax Officer indicated that the petitioners were indeed directors during the relevant period. The court emphasized that the determination of whether the petitioners were directors was a question of fact for the trial court to decide. The court rejected the petitioners' argument based on the memorandum and articles of association. 3. The petitioners also argued that the criminal trial should be stayed due to pending petitions for compounding the offences. The court referred to established law that a criminal trial should not be delayed solely because of statutory remedies being pursued by the parties. The court cited a Supreme Court case emphasizing that the discretion to adjourn or postpone a criminal trial should be judiciously exercised and not in a manner that obstructs the criminal proceedings' purpose. The court held that the mere pendency of a petition for compounding offences with the income-tax authorities did not warrant staying the criminal trial. Consequently, the court dismissed the petitioners' plea to stay the proceedings. In conclusion, the High Court of Madras, in the judgment delivered by Mrs. Padmini Jesudurai, dismissed the petitions filed by accused Nos. 6 and 7 to quash the proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court rejected the petitioners' contentions that they were not directors of the company and that the criminal trial should be stayed due to pending petitions for compounding the offences. The court emphasized that the determination of whether the petitioners were directors and the decision on staying the trial were matters for the trial court to decide and not for the present proceedings.
|
