1989 (5) TMI 31 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues:
Jurisdiction of Income-tax Officer to file complaints under section 277 of the Income-tax Act without complying with section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Analysis:
The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash complaints and authorizations under the Income-tax Act. Alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Income-tax Officer to file complaints for offences under section 277 without complying with section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Petitioner argued that the Income-tax Officer acted beyond authority in initiating proceedings under section 277 without complying with statutory provisions. Contention that section 277 does not apply if a false statement was made during proceedings under section 131 without an order of tax evasion. Petitioner filed the writ petition seeking relief on these grounds.

Legal Arguments:
Petitioner's advocate argued that the initiation of complaints was contrary to the law and should be interfered with by the court. Cited the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Act, 1976, emphasizing that disclosures made by the petitioner should prevent proceedings under section 277. Referenced case law to support the argument, including Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra and ITO v. Kerala Oil Mills, highlighting the judicial nature of Income-tax Officer proceedings under the Income-tax Act.

Respondent's Defense:
Respondent's counsel argued that the actions taken were lawful and in accordance with record maintenance requirements. Argued that there was no basis for the court to intervene in the matter.

Court's Decision:
After hearing arguments and reviewing the records, the court found that the petitioner had committed an offence under section 277 of the Income-tax Act. Court noted that the person lodging the complaint had the jurisdiction to do so within the law. Declined to interfere, finding no lack of jurisdiction. Concluded that the respondents' actions were not prohibitory, and the writ petition lacked merit, ultimately rejecting it. Discharged the rule, vacated interim orders, and imposed no costs. Stayed the operation of the order for four weeks.