2014 (3) TMI 672 - HC - Companies Law

Condonation of delay beyond 120 days - appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956. - Held that - The learned Single Judge in 2009 (9) TMI 575 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY held that on a correct reading of the Supreme Court decision in Union of India V/s. Popular Construction Company, (2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) it is clear beyond all doubt that the legislative intent underlying the constitution and establishment of the Company Law Board and insertion of section 10F is to limit the time within which an appeal can be filed. This time limit is absolute. It cannot be extended by a Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act. That decision binds me. - The appellant not only had knowledge of the impugned order in April 2012, but had a certified copy of it. The delay is beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed in Section 10F. There is absolutely no explanation for the delay. The company application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. - Decided against the applicant.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Condonation of delay in filing the appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. Determination of the starting point of limitation for filing the appeal.
3. Whether the appellant was entitled to a copy of the impugned order under Regulation 29(4) of the Company Law Board Regulations, 1991.
4. Whether the appeal can be treated as a cross-appeal or cross-objections.
5. Applicability of Article 227 of the Constitution of India to the appeal.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Condonation of Delay in Filing the Appeal:
The appellant filed an appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order dated 24th January 2012 passed by the Company Law Board (CLB). The court emphasized that it is well-settled that a court cannot condone delay beyond the maximum period of 120 days specified in Section 10F. The appellant argued that the delay should be computed from the date he received a copy of the impugned order, which he claimed was much later than the actual date of the order. The court found that the appellant knew of the impugned order at least by April 2012, making the appeal hopelessly out of time and dismissing the application for condonation of delay.

2. Determination of the Starting Point of Limitation:
The court examined the appellant's claim that the delay in filing the appeal should be computed from the date he received a copy of the impugned order, as per Regulation 29(4) of the CLB Regulations. The appellant contended that he only learned of the order in August 2012 and filed the appeal within the extended period of 60 days. However, the court found that the appellant had knowledge of the order by April 2012, as evidenced by his filing of a certified copy of the order in a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. Thus, the appeal was filed well beyond the maximum period of 120 days, making it time-barred.

3. Entitlement to a Copy of the Impugned Order under Regulation 29(4):
The appellant argued that he was entitled to a copy of the impugned order under Regulation 29(4) of the CLB Regulations, which requires that a copy of every order be communicated to the petitioner, the respondents, and other concerned parties. The court disagreed, stating that the term "other parties concerned" refers to persons who are parties to the specific matter before the CLB. Since the appellant was not a party to the modification application filed by the 7th respondent, he was not entitled to a copy of the order under Regulation 29(4).

4. Treatment of the Appeal as a Cross-Appeal or Cross-Objections:
The appellant requested that his appeal be treated as a cross-appeal or cross-objections to the appeal filed by the 7th respondent. The court rejected this argument, citing the specific and unambiguous wording of Section 10F, which does not allow for such treatment. The court also referred to the Supreme Court decision in Superintending Engineer v. B. Subba Reddy, which dealt with the 1940 Arbitration Act and Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and found it inapplicable to the present case.

5. Applicability of Article 227 of the Constitution of India:
The appellant suggested that the appeal be treated as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India due to the peculiar circumstances of the matter. The court dismissed this suggestion, stating that there were no peculiar circumstances in favor of the appellant that warranted such treatment. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 10F was to limit the time within which an appeal can be filed, and this time limit is absolute and cannot be extended by the court.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the company application for condonation of delay, finding that the appeal was filed well beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed in Section 10F. The court also dismissed the related company appeal and applications for stay of proceedings, as they did not survive the dismissal of the condonation application.