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2015 (5) TMI 563 - HC - VAT and Sales TaxPenalty in form DVAT-24A issued under Section 33 of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 - non-filing of stock statement online in form Stock-I - whether the respondent-commissioner has the power or jurisdiction to impose fine as a punishment under the provisions of Section 70(5) of the said Act through his delegate or such power to impose fine vests with the courts of criminal jurisdiction - Held that - A bare reading of Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act,1897, reveals that the expression punishable with fine stated under section 70(5) of the said Act indicates that section 70(5) of the said Act deals with offence as defined under the General Clauses Act, 1897. It is clear that the fine imposed under section 70(5) of the said act is for an offence as defined under Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which shall be tried by the court of criminal jurisdiction in accordance with section 26(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The commissioner or its delegates do not have power or jurisdiction to impose such fine. Thus, the impugned notices are liable to be quashed on the ground of jurisdiction alone. - Decided in favour of assessee.
Issues:
Challenge to default notices of penalty under DVAT Act for non-filing of stock statement online; Jurisdiction of Commissioner to impose fine under Section 70(5) of DVAT Act; Validity of notifications dated 16.08.2012, 30.10.2012, and 12.11.2012. Analysis: The judgment pertains to two writ petitions filed by M/s Shubham Marketing and Bharat Ram Raj Kumar & Co. challenging default notices of penalty issued under Section 33 of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 for not filing stock statements online. The petitioners argued that the power to impose fine as a punishment under Section 70(5) of the DVAT Act lies with the courts of criminal jurisdiction only, not with the Commissioner or his delegate. They contended that the term "fine" in Section 70(5) cannot be interpreted differently and that recovery provisions in the Act do not mention fines. The vires of three notifications were also contested as being contrary to the DVAT Act. The counsel for the respondents defended the notices, stating that the Commissioner has the authority to impose fines under the DVAT Act. The court, after hearing both parties, decided not to delve into the validity of the challenged notifications. The central issue was whether the Commissioner had the jurisdiction to impose fines under Section 70(5) of the DVAT Act or if this power rested with the courts of criminal jurisdiction. The court analyzed Section 70(5) of the DVAT Act, which indicates that failure to comply with a requirement may be "punishable with fine." Referring to the General Clauses Act, the court noted that the term "fine" in Section 70(5) refers to an "offence" as defined in the General Clauses Act. It further cited Section 26(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, stating that offences punishable with fines only can be tried by magistrates. Consequently, the court held that fines under Section 70(5) of the DVAT Act are for offences and must be tried by courts of criminal jurisdiction, not by the Commissioner or delegates. In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners, quashing the impugned notices dated 08.03.2013 and 21.02.2013. The writ petitions were allowed, and pending applications were disposed of, with no order as to costs.
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