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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the compensation received by the assessee could be assessed as capital gains u/s 45(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Summary: Issue 1: Compensation as Capital Gains u/s 45(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal referred the question of whether the compensation received by the assessee in the sum of Rs. 5,55,850 could be assessed as capital gains u/s 45(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee, a company running a cotton spinning and weaving mill, received compensation from the insurance company due to a fire in the spinning department. The Income-tax Officer included the compensation as income, treating the excess realization as "capital gains" u/s 45 of the Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed, holding that the compensation was not chargeable under "Capital gains." The Revenue appealed, and the Tribunal upheld the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's view, stating that destruction by fire did not constitute a "transfer" as defined u/s 2(47) of the Act. The Tribunal emphasized that "transfer" implied a bilateral act, and destruction by fire did not fit this definition. The Revenue's counsel argued that the definition of "transfer" u/s 2(47) included "extinguishment of any rights" in a capital asset, which should cover the destruction by fire. The counsel cited cases like Marybong & Kyel Tea Estates Ltd. v. CIT and CIT v. Vania Silk Mills (P.) Ltd., where compensation for damaged assets was treated as capital gains. However, the court found these cases distinguishable based on specific facts and conditions of the insurance policies involved. The court examined the argument that "transfer" should involve a bilateral act and found it unconvincing. It held that the legislative intent behind the definition u/s 2(47) was to include extinguishment of rights in a capital asset, even if the asset itself was destroyed. The court referenced legal principles and precedents to support this interpretation, emphasizing that legislative definitions could extend beyond ordinary meanings to achieve statutory objectives. Ultimately, the court concluded that the compensation received by the assessee for the extinguishment of its property rights due to fire constituted a "transfer" within the meaning of section 2(47) and was thus assessable as capital gains u/s 45(1) of the Act. The reference was answered in the affirmative, in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee, with costs to be borne by the parties.
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