2015 (12) TMI 1473 - HC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay in filing of appeal - Power of tribunal under SAFEMA to condone the delay - Forfeiture of property - Detention order - Respondent No.3 and his wife failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that the suit property was acquired from legal sources - Held that - Appeal admittedly was filed on 6th June, 2012. Therefore clearly the appeal was filed after a period of 106 days from the date on which the order was served upon the Petitioners. On an ex-facie reading of section 12(4), it is clear that the appeal is to be filed within a period of 45 days from the date on which the order is served on the aggrieved person. If the appeal is not filed within the aforesaid period, under the proviso to section 12(4), the Appellate Tribunal is given the power to condone the delay for an additional period of 15 days, but not thereafter. This is ex-facie apparent from the clear language of the proviso to section 12(4) which categorically stipulates that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the said period of 45 days but not after 60 days from the date aforesaid, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. The words but not after 60 days are of great significance. These words indicate that there is a clear mandate that beyond the period of 60 days from the date on which the order is served upon the aggrieved person, the Appellate Tribunal has no power to condone the delay. SAFEMA is a special law and that section 12(4) provides for a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, inter alia stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, provisions of section 3 thereof shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any such special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local legislation. - under the provisions of section 12(4) read with the proviso thereto, the Appellate Tribunal had no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on which the order impugned in the appeal was served on the aggrieved party. In the facts of the present case, admittedly, the appeal of the Petitioners was filed beyond the period of 60 days from the date on which the order was served upon them. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the impugned order dated 12th March, 2013 passed by Respondent No.1. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as a Division Bench of this Court, we are clearly of the view that Respondent No.1 had no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on which the order was served upon the Petitioners. As stated earlier, it is admitted that the appeal of the Petitioners was not filed within the aforesaid period, and therefore, clearly time barred. In this view of the matter, no fault can be found with the impugned order requiring interference in our extraordinary, equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. - Decided against the appellant.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Challenge to the order of forfeiture of property under SAFEMA.
2. Applicability of SARFAESI Act provisions over SAFEMA.
3. Condonation of delay in filing the appeal under SAFEMA.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Challenge to the order of forfeiture of property under SAFEMA:
The Petitioners challenged the order dated 12th March 2013 passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property, New Delhi, and the order dated 23rd September 2011 passed by Respondent No.2 under section 7 of SAFEMA. The suit property was declared illegally acquired and forfeited to the Central Government. Respondent No.3 and his wife failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the legal acquisition of the property, leading to the forfeiture order.

2. Applicability of SARFAESI Act provisions over SAFEMA:
The Petitioners initially argued that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act would override SAFEMA where inconsistencies existed. However, this contention was later not pressed, and the court did not render a finding on this aspect.

3. Condonation of delay in filing the appeal under SAFEMA:
The primary issue for the court was whether Respondent No.1 was justified in rejecting the appeal on the grounds of being time-barred. The Petitioners argued that the appeal was filed within the prescribed time under section 12(4) of SAFEMA, considering the date they received the necessary documents. The court, however, held that the time to file the appeal started from the date the order was served (20th February 2012), and not from when the Petitioners received additional documents. The appeal was filed on 6th June 2012, well beyond the 60-day limit, making it time-barred.

Legal Analysis:
The court emphasized the clear language of section 12(4) of SAFEMA, which mandates that an appeal must be filed within 45 days from the date the order is served, with a possible extension of 15 days if sufficient cause is shown, but "not after 60 days." This provision explicitly excludes the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for condonation of delay. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in *Union of India v. Popular Construction Company* and a Division Bench decision in *Flemingo (Duty Free Shop) P. Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), Mumbai-I* to support its interpretation that the Appellate Tribunal had no power to condone delays beyond 60 days.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the Petitioners' writ petition, finding no infirmity in the impugned order dated 12th March 2013, which dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The judgment clarified that any observations made were without prejudice to the Petitioners' rights against Respondent No.3. The rule was discharged, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.