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Issues:
- Petition for quashing C.C. No. 51 of 1993 under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. - Allegations under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. - Interpretation of settlement letter and novation of cheque claim. - Determining the date of the offense under section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. - Application of section 142(b) regarding the cause of action. - Commencement of the period of limitation under section 469(a) in relation to the offense. Analysis: 1. The accused filed a petition under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking to quash C.C. No. 51 of 1993, which was a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complaint alleged that the accused issued a cheque that was dishonored due to insufficient funds, constituting an offense under the Act. 2. The complaint detailed the transaction where the accused sold rice to the complainant, who issued a cheque for partial payment that bounced due to insufficient funds. Despite a settlement letter promising payment, the accused failed to settle the claim, leading to the re-presentation of the cheque and subsequent legal notices. 3. The accused contended that the settlement letter novated the cheque claim, making a civil court the appropriate remedy. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that the complainant had only delayed legal action due to the settlement letter and had the right to proceed under criminal law. 4. The issue of determining the date of the offense under section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act was raised. The defense argued that the cause of action arose when the accused denied the allegations in his reply. However, the court held that the cause of action only arises after the expiry of fifteen days from the receipt of the notice, as per the Act's provisions. 5. Section 142(b) was invoked to determine the timeline for filing a complaint, which should be within one month of the cause of action arising under section 138(c). The court clarified that the cause of action does not arise at the time of denial but after the expiry of the specified period, allowing the accused to make payment and avoid prosecution. 6. The defense cited section 469(a) to argue that the offense should be deemed to have been committed on the date of denial. However, the court rejected this argument, emphasizing the specific provisions of sections 138(c) and 142(b) regarding the cause of action and the commencement of the limitation period. 7. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, rejecting all submissions made by the defense counsel and affirming that the cause of action does not arise at the time of denial but after the prescribed period, in accordance with the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
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