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Issues Involved:
1. Premature Invocation of Criminal Process 2. Computation of Time-Frame under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 3. Introduction of New Material in Proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 4. Scope of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act Detailed Analysis: 1. Premature Invocation of Criminal Process: The primary issue addressed was whether a complainant can invoke the criminal process alleging an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the prescribed time and whether such an infirmity is curable or fatal to the prosecution. The court held that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days as prescribed under sub-clause (c) of Section 138 has elapsed. Therefore, the complaint filed on August 9, 1991, was premature since it was filed before the 15-day period had elapsed from the date of service of the notice (July 29, 1991). Consequently, the Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance of the complaint, rendering the proceedings liable to be quashed. 2. Computation of Time-Frame under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: The court examined the correct manner of computing the time-frame prescribed in Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 138(c) requires that the drawer of the cheque must fail to make payment within 15 days of receiving the notice of dishonour. Section 142(b) stipulates that a complaint must be made within one month of the cause of action arising, which is after the 15-day period has elapsed. The court emphasized that the offence is deemed to have been committed only after the 15-day period has expired without payment being made. Therefore, presenting a complaint before this period is premature and invalid. 3. Introduction of New Material in Proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: The court addressed whether new material could be introduced in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to amend statements or factual positions. It was held that no new material can be introduced at this stage. The court must be circumscribed by the record that was before the Magistrate at the time of taking cognizance. Consequently, any affidavit or certificate produced later cannot be considered. The court relied on precedents such as State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma and Smt. Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal to reinforce this principle. 4. Scope of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: The court discussed whether Section 138 should be restricted to cases where the rejection slip reads "insufficiency of funds" or whether it applies broadly to any dishonour of a cheque. The court concluded that Section 138 was intended as a remedy for the widespread practice of issuing dishonoured cheques. The reasons for dishonour, whether it be "refer to drawer," "account closed," or any other reason, are immaterial. The critical factor is the failure to make payment within the stipulated period. The court referred to various judgments to support this view, including decisions from the Kerala High Court, Punjab and Haryana High Court, and Calcutta High Court. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 138 was to ensure that dishonour of cheques attracts criminal consequences, irrespective of the specific reason for dishonour. Conclusion: The court quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioner, setting aside the Magistrate's order dated August 9, 1991. It was held that the complaint was premature and void in law as it was filed before the expiration of the 15-day period prescribed under Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court also reiterated that no new material could be introduced in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the scope of Section 138 encompasses any dishonour of a cheque, not just those due to insufficiency of funds.
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