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Issues Involved:
1. Defamation: Whether the statements made by the defendants were defamatory. 2. Absolute Privilege: Whether the statements made by the defendants were protected by absolute privilege. 3. Cause of Action: Whether the plaint discloses any cause of action. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Defamation: The plaintiff filed a suit against the Union of India and five others to recover Rs. 1 lac as damages for defamation. The plaintiff alleged that on October 20, 1956, a telephone directory published by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 contained a defamatory entry against the plaintiff, describing her as "Miss Prostitution Solicitor." The plaintiff had previously filed a suit (Suit No. 30 of 1958) against the same defendants, claiming Rs. 50,000 in damages for this defamatory entry. During the proceedings of that suit, on October 17, 1961, defendant No. 6, instructed by defendant No. 5, made statements in court alleging that the plaintiff was a divorcee, divorced on grounds of unchastity and immorality, and that she was making her daughter lead an immoral life. These statements were made to seek an adjournment for presenting evidence to mitigate the quantum of damages claimed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed these statements were defamatory and made with malicious intent to lower her reputation. 2. Absolute Privilege: The defendants raised the defense that the alleged defamatory statements were made in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings and were therefore protected by absolute privilege. They argued that such statements, made during judicial proceedings, are absolutely privileged under common law, which has been applied in India. The plaintiff contended that in India, advocates do not enjoy absolute privilege and that the law of defamation is governed by Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, which does not recognize absolute privilege for advocates in civil actions for libel or slander. The court examined the relevant legal principles and precedents, including passages from Halsbury's Laws of England and Gatley on Libel and Slander, which state that no action lies for defamatory statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, whether the statements are relevant or irrelevant, malicious or not. The court also referred to several Indian High Court decisions that have applied the English common law rule of absolute privilege to civil actions for defamation. The court concluded that the statements made by defendant No. 6 were made in the ordinary course of a judicial proceeding and were relevant to the cause, thus constituting an absolutely privileged occasion. 3. Cause of Action: The court addressed whether the plaint disclosed any cause of action if the statements were found to be absolutely privileged. The court held that if the occasion of the statements was absolutely privileged, the plaintiff's action for defamation would not be maintainable. The court noted that the plaintiff's allegations in the plaint, assumed to be true for the purpose of the preliminary issues, clearly indicated that the statements were made during judicial proceedings and were relevant to the cause. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action because the statements were protected by absolute privilege. Conclusion: The court found that the statements made by defendant No. 6 were absolutely privileged as they were made in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings and were relevant to the cause. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit for damages for defamation was not maintainable. The court dismissed the suit with costs, answering the preliminary issues in favor of the defendants.
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