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Issues Involved:
1. Whether an order under section 23A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by the Finance Act, 1955, is governed by the time-limit specified in section 34(3). 2. Whether the first petitioner had commercial profits that could justify a further distribution of dividends. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Applicability of Time-Limit Specified in Section 34(3) to Orders under Section 23A Context and Facts: The first petitioner, a public limited company, faced an order under section 23A for the assessment year 1957-58. The Income-tax Officer issued a notice on 15th November 1961, questioning why an order under section 23A should not be made. The first petitioner contended that the proceedings were barred by the period of limitation prescribed in section 34(3). Legal Arguments and Reasoning: The main question was whether an order under section 23A could be made at any time or if it was subject to the four-year limitation period specified in section 34(3). Section 34(3) states that no order of assessment or reassessment shall be made after four years from the end of the assessment year, with specific exceptions. The court examined whether an order under section 23A constitutes an "order of assessment." The term "assessment" in the Income-tax Act has varied meanings, including the computation of income, determination of tax payable, and the entire procedure for imposing tax liability. Nature of Section 23A Orders: The court noted that prior to its amendment, section 23A was a computation section, not an assessment section. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that orders under the unamended section 23A could be made at any time, as they did not constitute assessment orders. However, after the amendment by the Finance Act, 1955, section 23A transformed into an assessment section. The amended section imposed a liability to super-tax on companies under certain conditions, making it an order of assessment. The court rejected the argument that the imposition under section 23A was a penalty, emphasizing that the term "super-tax" was used, which connotes tax rather than penalty. Conclusion: The court concluded that an order under the amended section 23A is an order of assessment, subject to the four-year limitation period specified in section 34(3). Since the notice was issued after the expiration of this period, the proceedings were deemed without jurisdiction. The court issued a writ of mandamus quashing the notice and a writ of prohibition restraining further action. Issue 2: Commercial Profits and Further Distribution of Dividends Context and Facts: The second ground raised by the petitioners was that the first petitioner had no commercial profits warranting further dividend distribution. They argued that enforcing such distribution would result in the distribution of capital, which is contrary to law. Legal Arguments and Reasoning: The court did not entertain this ground, noting that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had not yet given his approval for the order under section 23A. The first petitioner had multiple avenues for redressal, including appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal, and potentially the High Court via reference under section 66. The court emphasized that the determination of whether the smallness of profit justified a lesser dividend distribution is a matter for the revenue authorities, not the court, except in cases where a question of law arises. Conclusion: The court declined to entertain the second ground on the merits, citing the availability of specific and adequate alternative remedies for the first petitioner. Final Judgment: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners on the primary ground, stating that the proceedings under section 23A were barred by the limitation period specified in section 34(3). Consequently, the notice issued by the Income-tax Officer was quashed, and further action under section 23A was prohibited. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the petition to the first petitioner.
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