1914 (3) TMI 1 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of proceedings under Sections 177, 193, 196, 199, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Requirement of sanction for prosecution under Section 177.
3. Determination of whether an Income-tax Collector is a "Court" under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
4. Validity of complaint delegation by a public servant.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of Proceedings under Sections 177, 193, 196, 199, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code:
The applicant faced complaints for offenses under Sections 177, 193, 196, 199, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. These offenses fall under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The offenses arose from actions related to proceedings before an Income-tax Collector, who is a public servant. For the offense under Section 177, the sanction from the Income-tax Collector was required under Clause (a) of Section 195. However, the sanction given by the Income-tax Collector was deemed spent before the complaint was made, rendering the proceedings under Section 177 unlawful and necessitating their dismissal. The same infirmity applied to Sections 193, 196, 199, and 471 if the Income-tax Collector was considered a "Court" under Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 195.

2. Requirement of Sanction for Prosecution under Section 177:
The sanction for prosecution under Section 177 was provided by the Income-tax Collector but was no longer valid at the time of the complaint due to the lapse of more than six months. Consequently, the proceedings under Section 177 were not lawful from their inception and should be set aside.

3. Determination of Whether an Income-tax Collector is a "Court" under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code:
The core issue was whether an Income-tax Collector qualifies as a "Court" under Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court referred to previous judgments, including In re Kalidas, which held that an Income-tax Collector is not a "Court" under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, other judgments, such as In re Nanchand, suggested that an Income-tax Collector could be considered a "Court" due to their authority to summon witnesses, take evidence, and administer oaths under the Oaths Act. The court concluded that the purpose of Section 195 is to ensure that prosecutions for false evidence given on oath require sanction, regardless of the forum. The court decided to refer the question to a Full Bench for a definitive ruling.

4. Validity of Complaint Delegation by a Public Servant:
The complaint against the applicant was lodged by a Resident First Class Magistrate on the order of the District Magistrate or the Collector. The argument was made that since the Collector is a public servant to whom the Income-tax Collector is subordinate, the complaint could be considered valid under Clause (a) of Section 195. However, the court held that the public servant must either give a sanction or personally make the complaint. Delegation of the complaint-making function was not permissible. Therefore, the proceedings could not be supported by this argument.

Full Bench Decision:
The Full Bench, consisting of Scott C.J., Batchelor, and Beaman JJ., addressed the question of whether an Income-tax Collector is a "Court" within the meaning of Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The term "Court" was defined in the section to mean a Civil, Revenue, or Criminal Court. The Full Bench concluded that the Income-tax Collector, performing functions under Act II of 1886, acts as a Revenue Court. This conclusion was based on the judicial nature of inquiries conducted under the Income-tax Act and the statutory fiction provided by Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, which deems such proceedings to be judicial.

Final Order:
Following the Full Bench's decision that an Income-tax Collector is a "Revenue Court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Division Court (Heaton and Shah JJ.) set aside the proceedings and made the rule issued by the court on January 7, 1914, absolute.