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Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the payment received by the appellant company: capital payment vs. income payment. 2. Liability for income tax on the payment. 3. Liability for excess profits tax on the payment. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Nature of the Payment Received by the Appellant Company: Capital Payment vs. Income Payment The primary issue in this case was whether the sum of lb16,306 16s. 11d. received by the appellant company from the shipping company upon its liquidation was a capital payment or an income payment. The Special Commissioners had classified this payment as "remuneration under a service agreement" and considered it a trading receipt on revenue account. The court disagreed with this classification. It emphasized that the fourth article of the agreement, which stipulated that the remuneration payable to the appellant company would become immediately due upon the liquidation of the shipping company, was intended to measure the compensation for the premature termination of the agreement. The court noted that the payment was not for services rendered after liquidation but was a measure of compensation for the inability to perform future services due to the liquidation. This interpretation aligned with the principle stated by Lord Buckmaster in Glenboig Union Fireclay Co., Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, where the measure of compensation did not convert the payment into an annual profit. The court further highlighted that the agreement's termination resulted in the appellant company losing its primary business, which constituted the majority of its income. This loss forced the company to reduce staff and relocate, indicating a significant impact on its business structure. The court concluded that the payment was for the surrender of a capital asset, not an income payment. 2. Liability for Income Tax on the Payment The court addressed the income tax implications, stating that the Special Commissioners' view of the payment as income was incorrect. The court referred to Lord Cave's principle from British Insulated and Helsby Cables, Ltd. v. Atherton, which distinguishes between capital and revenue expenditures. The court applied this principle, noting that the payment was made once and for all for the surrender of a capital asset, thus classifying it as a capital payment. The court also distinguished this case from Kelsall Parsons & Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, where the payment was for the loss of a single agency among many, and the company's profits remained unaffected. In contrast, the appellant company's entire business was built on the agreement with the shipping company, and its termination significantly altered the company's business structure. 3. Liability for Excess Profits Tax on the Payment The court found that the same reasoning applied to the liability for excess profits tax. The payment was not an annual profit but a capital payment for the loss of the company's primary business asset. Therefore, the court concluded that the payment should not be subject to excess profits tax. Separate Judgments Delivered by the Judges: LORD MONCRIEFF: Lord Moncrieff agreed with the Lord President's analysis, emphasizing that the payment was for the transfer of an enduring trading asset, pointing to a capital transaction. He noted that the agency contract was the appellant company's main asset, and its termination effectively ended the company's business as it existed. He also highlighted that the Commissioners' finding was based on a misinterpretation of the agreement, and the payment was indeed a capital payment. LORD CARMONT: Lord Carmont concurred, stating that the Commissioners' conclusion was based solely on the construction of the agreement, which was incorrect. He reiterated that the payment was a measure of damages for the cessation of the relationship between the two companies, making it a capital payment. LORD RUSSELL: Lord Russell agreed with the analysis and had nothing to add. Conclusion: The court concluded that the payment received by the appellant company was a capital payment, not subject to income tax or excess profits tax. The Special Commissioners' interpretation of the agreement was incorrect, and the payment was for the surrender of a capital asset, significantly impacting the appellant company's business structure.
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