2010 (10) TMI 1194 - SC - Indian Laws

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal - Contempt proceeding against the judicial officer - alleging non-implementation of the order - whether issuance of notice to initiate contempt proceeding would be justified merely on assumption, speculation and inference drawn from facts without existence of a clear case of wilful disobedience to the order of the High Court so as to treat it as a case of contempt of Court of civil nature? - HELD THAT - In our view, if the learned single Judge was of the view that the interim order of stay granted by the Court on 22.03.2001 in favour of the Insurance Company staying execution of the award of compensation in favour of the claimant was obstructed, the learned single Judge ought to have hauled up those officers in the registry for contempt who had been functioning in the registry at the relevant time and factually it was not correct for the learned Judge to assume that it was the petitioner who obstructed the administration of justice so as to justify initiation of contempt proceedings against an officer who joined five years later on the ground that he had sought the case number and the date of the order which was to be implemented in order to forestall the same when in fact it was already not implemented for a long number of years which was more than four years prior to the appellant's posting in the High Court. As already stated, an officer in the registry who joined approximately five years later prior to the interim order of stay which was passed, he cannot legitimately be hauled up for contempt merely on unfounded assumption and speculation that it was he who was instrumental in obstructing the administration of justice by ensuring that the order of stay may not be implemented. In fact, when the Registrar (Vigilance) sought a copy of the interim order of stay, it was his duty to specify the case number and the date of the order as it cannot be expected that the copy of the order could be sent to the Registrar (Vigilance) without the case number or its date. In any view, it would be too far fetched to infer that the same was done to shield the learned Judge of the MACT Shri Bansal against whom vigilance enquiry was ordered, completely missing the relevant point that he had already superannuated two years earlier after which the learned Single Judge himself had ordered for closure of the vigilance enquiry against him. We are of the view that the learned single Judge inferred and assumed erroneously that the appellant had the intention to obstruct the administration of justice by being instrumental in ensuring that the interim order passed in 2001 may not be implemented oblivious of the fact that the appellant was posted in the registry of the High Court only four years later in 2005 and hence non-implementation of the interim order of stay cannot be attributed to the appellant to shield the Judge of the MACT, Jaipur who had retired way back in the year 2003 against whom the enquiry was ordered to be closed by the learned Single Judge himself. Thus, initiation of the contempt proceeding against the petitioner by the learned single Judge is based on a wholly wrong premise based on unsustainable and unfounded facts which cannot be treated sufficient material so as to initiate contempt proceeding in spite of absence of any degree of fault or misconduct or even unintentional disobedience to the order for the reasons assigned hereinbefore. Hence, we set aside the impugned order dated 08.12.2006 passed by the learned single Judge by which the proceeding for contempt has been ordered to be initiated by registering a regular contempt proceeding against the appellant and the same shall be treated as dropped. Consequently, the appeal is allowed directing the parties to bear their cost.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Justification of initiating suo motu contempt proceedings.
2. Existence of prima facie material for contempt.
3. Applicability of Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
4. Nature of contempt: Civil or Criminal.
5. Wilful disobedience as a criterion for contempt.
6. Responsibility for non-implementation of the interim order.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Justification of initiating suo motu contempt proceedings:
The appeal challenges the initiation of suo motu contempt proceedings by a learned single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan against the appellant, a Deputy Registrar (Judicial). The proceedings were initiated based on the assumption that the appellant obstructed the administration of justice by not implementing an interim order dated 22.03.2001. The Supreme Court scrutinized whether the learned single Judge was justified in initiating such proceedings without prima facie material indicating wilful disobedience.

2. Existence of prima facie material for contempt:
The Supreme Court noted that the appellant joined as Deputy Registrar (Judicial) in 2005, while the alleged non-implementation of the order dated 22.03.2001 occurred much earlier. The appellant's communication to the Registrar (Vigilance) was a routine procedural requirement, and there was no evidence of wilful disobedience. The Court emphasized that initiating contempt proceedings based on assumptions and speculation without clear evidence of wilful disobedience was unjustified.

3. Applicability of Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
The appellant argued that the learned single Judge erred by not considering Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which requires a Bench of not less than two Judges to hear and determine cases of criminal contempt. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the alleged contempt, even if made out, would be of a civil nature, not criminal. Therefore, the learned single Judge was authorized to initiate contempt proceedings.

4. Nature of contempt: Civil or Criminal:
The Supreme Court analyzed Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which defines civil and criminal contempt. The Court concluded that the alleged contempt in this case, if any, was of a civil nature, involving wilful disobedience of a court order. The initiation of contempt proceedings against the appellant was not sustainable as there was no evidence of wilful disobedience.

5. Wilful disobedience as a criterion for contempt:
The Court reiterated that for contempt of a civil nature to be established, there must be wilful disobedience of a court order. The facts of the case indicated that the appellant's actions were routine and procedural, without any intent to obstruct justice. The Court emphasized that contempt proceedings cannot be based on assumptions and speculation without clear evidence of wilful disobedience.

6. Responsibility for non-implementation of the interim order:
The Supreme Court observed that the responsibility for communicating the interim order of stay dated 22.03.2001 primarily lay with the counsel or the party in whose favor the order was passed. The appellant, who joined the High Court in 2005, could not be held responsible for non-implementation of the order that occurred years earlier. The Court emphasized that the appellant's communication to the Registrar (Vigilance) seeking case details was a routine requirement and did not indicate any intent to obstruct justice.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the initiation of contempt proceedings against the appellant was based on unfounded assumptions and speculation. The Court set aside the impugned order dated 08.12.2006 and directed that the contempt proceedings against the appellant be treated as dropped. The appeal was allowed, with each party bearing their own costs.