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Issues Involved:
1. Whether making a provision for pocket expenses amounts to maintenance capable of enlarging into a full-fledged right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 2. Whether the defendant in a suit is obliged to prove the Will even in the face of admission of the Will by the plaintiff in the plaint. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Provision for Pocket Expenses as Maintenance: The court examined whether the provision for pocket expenses to Seethamahalaxmi under a settlement deed could be considered as maintenance, thereby enlarging into an absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The court found that the settlement deed (Ex. A1) did not create maintenance rights but kept Seethamahalaxmi's claim for maintenance intact. The deed explicitly stated that the land was given for her life without powers of alienation and would revert to the family after her lifetime. This was corroborated by the compromise memo (Ex. A3) and the decree (Ex. A4), which also limited her rights to a life interest. Consequently, Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applied, and not Section 14(1). Thus, Seethamahalaxmi did not acquire an absolute right over the properties under Items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule properties. 2. Obligation to Prove the Will: The court addressed whether the defendant needed to prove the Will when the plaintiff had admitted its existence in the plaint. The plaintiff had admitted the execution of the Wills but contested their legal validity concerning the suit schedule properties. The court held that since the plaintiff admitted the execution of the Will, there was no need for the defendants to prove it under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. The court emphasized that Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, which states that facts admitted need not be proved, was applicable. The court disagreed with the learned single Judge's finding that the Will needed to be proved according to the Indian Evidence Act provisions, as the plaintiff had not disputed its execution but only its legal effect on specific properties. Conclusion: The court concluded that Seethamahalaxmi did not acquire absolute ownership of the properties under Items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule properties, as her rights were limited to a life interest under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently, the 1st appellant, who derived rights from Seethamahalaxmi, was the absolute owner of Items 1 and 2. However, Item 3 of the suit schedule property, which fell to Laxminarayana in partition, reverted to the plaintiff upon Seethamahalaxmi's death, as it was not covered by the Will and Section 14(2) applied. The Letters Patent Appeal was allowed in part, affirming the plaintiff's ownership of Item 3 and setting aside the judgments regarding Items 1 and 2. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.
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