1967 (7) TMI 134 - HC - Indian Laws

Validity of execution - time limitation - the execution was barred because the execution was sought beyond a period of three years of the making of the award - Held that - This case has no connection whatsoever with cases such as those where procedural orders are made by the Debt Court in a proceeding under this Act, but under the provision of the Civil Procedure Code, and which are held to be applicable, because its proceedings are governed by the Civil Procedure Code. In such cases, it is possible to say that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 43, providing for appeals against certain orders made under the Act, an appeal may also lie under the Civil Procedure Code. Application dismissed.

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of the Limitation Act regarding the execution of an award under the Hyderabad Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1956.
2. Applicability of the new Limitation Act, 1963, Art. 136 in the context of the case.
3. Examination of relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Agricultural Debtors Relief Act.
4. Determination of whether the award should be considered a decree for execution purposes.
5. Comparison with a previous case involving the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act.
6. Analysis of Section 47 of the H. A. D. R. Act regarding the application of the Civil Procedure Code.
7. Differentiation between procedural and substantive provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to the case.

Analysis:

1. The case involved a revisional application by judgment-debtors challenging the execution of an award under the Hyderabad Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1956. The debt court made an award in 1957, which was registered in 1961. The judgment-debtors argued that the execution was time-barred under Art. 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as it was sought beyond three years from the making of the award.

2. The trial Judge held that the application was within time as it was filed within three years from the date of registration in 1961. The Judges applied Art. 136 of the new Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a 12-year period for execution of a decree, rejecting the debtors' contention based on Art. 182.

3. The argument centered around the interpretation of Art. 182 of the Limitation Act and the relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Agricultural Debtors Relief Act. Section 38 of the Act mandates the registration of every award, and Section 51 outlines the registration process. The delay in registration was noted, but no reasons were provided for the delay.

4. The crucial question was whether the award should be considered a decree for execution purposes. The Court determined that the award under the H. A. D. R. Act was distinct from a decree of a Civil Court and should be executed as an award under the Act, not as per the Civil Procedure Code. This distinction was pivotal in deciding the applicability of the Limitation Act provisions.

5. A comparison was drawn with a previous case involving the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, where a deeming provision transformed an award into a decree for execution purposes. In contrast, the H. A. D. R. Act did not contain such a deeming provision, reinforcing the view that the award under this Act should not be equated with a decree.

6. Section 47 of the H. A. D. R. Act was analyzed to determine the application of the Civil Procedure Code to the proceedings. It was concluded that only procedural provisions applied, and the final adjudication of the Debt Adjustment Court could not be termed a decree under the Civil Procedure Code.

7. The judgment clarified the distinction between procedural and substantive provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in the context of the case. It emphasized that the final adjudication by the Debt Court under the H. A. D. R. Act did not meet the definition of a decree and should be executed as an award under the Act.