2001 (1) TMI 1007 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Prohibition of stay in proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
2. Interpretation of Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
3. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
4. Legislative intent behind the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
5. Impact of judicial delays on corruption cases.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Prohibition of Stay in Proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:
The judgment emphasizes that Parliament imposed an undiluted ban against granting stay of any proceedings involving an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The court is clear that no court shall circumvent this ban through any means. The legislative intent is to expedite the proceedings and prevent any delays caused by parties raising questions before higher courts during the pendency of trial proceedings. The prohibition is absolute and admits no exceptions, as highlighted in the language of the statute.

2. Interpretation of Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:
Section 19(3) contains three clauses with prohibitions. Clause (a) prohibits reversal or alteration of any finding or sentence by a Special Judge on the ground of errors in sanction unless it results in a failure of justice. Clause (b) restricts stay of proceedings on the sanction aspect alone unless it results in a failure of justice. Clause (c) explicitly states, "No court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground." The court clarifies that this prohibition applies universally and not just in the exercise of revisional powers.

3. Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code:
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is distinct from its revisional jurisdiction. However, the court concludes that the inherent power cannot be exercised to circumvent the specific prohibition in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The inherent power is meant to be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The court rejects the argument that Section 19(3)(c) does not apply to the High Court's inherent jurisdiction.

4. Legislative Intent behind the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:
The legislative intent behind the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, is to expedite proceedings and combat corruption effectively. The Act includes provisions for day-to-day trials and prohibits the grant of stay and exercise of revisional powers on interlocutory orders to prevent delays. The court underscores the importance of adhering to this legislative intent to ensure swift and effective prosecution of corruption cases.

5. Impact of Judicial Delays on Corruption Cases:
The judgment highlights the adverse impact of judicial delays on corruption cases. The court notes that stays are often granted without considering the statutory prohibition, leading to significant delays in trials. This undermines efforts to combat corruption among public servants. The court directs the Registrars of all High Courts to list cases where stays have been granted in contravention of the Act and to take appropriate action in light of this judgment to expedite the trials.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court reiterates that no stay of proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is permissible on any ground, including the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judgment emphasizes the need to adhere to the legislative intent of expediting corruption cases and directs High Courts to review and expedite pending cases where stays have been granted. The appeal is dismissed, and the trial is ordered to proceed on a day-to-day basis to conclude within six months.