9911796707
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Issues:
- Delay in making an application to set aside an abatement after the death of a defendant in a suit. - Determination of whether there was a reasonable explanation for the delay. - Consideration of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. - Application of a liberal construction to the expression "sufficient cause" to advance substantial justice. - Exercise of discretion by the trial judge in favor of the plaintiffs. Analysis: The judgment involves an appeal from an order setting aside an abatement in a suit where the plaintiffs sought certain rights against the deceased defendant. The delay in making an application to set aside the abatement was crucial. The Court noted that the plaintiffs obtained information about the proper persons to be substituted as executors of the deceased defendant on August 23, 1948, but failed to take immediate steps, resulting in the application being filed after the expiry of the sixty-day period. The primary issue was whether there was a reasonable explanation for the delay in making the application. The Court considered the circumstances surrounding the delay, including the physical condition of the male plaintiff, who was not in Calcutta during the critical period. The Court acknowledged that while the delay could have been avoided, a reasonably liberal view should be taken, considering the difficulties faced by litigants and the delays inherent in the legal system. Reference was made to previous cases where a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was emphasized to advance substantial justice. The judgment highlighted the importance of not excusing inordinate delays but also cautioned against being too strict, as it might defeat the ends of justice. The Court emphasized that the standard applied should not be too exacting, and the delay should be assessed considering all circumstances. Ultimately, the Court upheld the trial judge's exercise of discretion in favor of the plaintiffs, dismissing the appeal without costs. In a separate opinion, another judge expressed doubt regarding whether sufficient cause had been adequately demonstrated for the delay in making the application. The judge noted that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently accounted for the delay between August 23, 1948, and September 21, 1948. Emphasis was placed on the requirement that "sufficient cause" must be beyond the control of the party invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that negligence of the party cannot constitute sufficient cause. Despite the doubt raised, the judge concurred with the trial judge's exercise of discretion under Section 5, ultimately agreeing with the order proposed. Overall, the judgment delves into the complexities of assessing delays in legal proceedings, balancing the need for diligence with the recognition of practical challenges faced by litigants. The application of a liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" under the law and the discretion exercised by the trial judge played a significant role in the final decision to dismiss the appeal.
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