2015 (7) TMI 1329 - HC - Indian Laws

Demand for payment of property tax on the suit property - coercive steps for recovery of the impugned amount of property tax - Right to file an appeal - HELD THAT - A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit - Courts have the jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature with the only limitation being the right expressly or impliedly barred by law. Many statutes contain express bars with respect to the right to file a civil suit. For instance, Section 293 of the Income Tax Act contains such a bar. Similarly there are a number of other statutes containing such a bar - except where a civil suit is specifically barred under a particular statute there can be no bar to a civil suit. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law. It is enough that no statute bars the suit. The jurisdiction of civil court is all embracing. It is determined on the basis of pleadings of the plaintiff in the suit. The mere fact that a statute provides for certain remedies is not sufficient to exclude jurisdiction of civil courts. The right to approach the civil courts is an inherent right which normally cannot be taken away or presumed to be taken away. The right is too strong to be denied by indirect means. Only a specific bar could take it away. While on the question of express or implied bar to a civil suit, the Division Bench noted that elsewhere in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, where the legislature intended to create a specific bar to exercise of right to file a civil suit, it had specifically provided for it. In this connection the Division Bench made a reference to Sections 347A, 347B and 347E of the Act, in matters relating to unauthorised construction in properties and demolition of such construction, the statute having established an Appellate Tribunal before which the parties were entitled to agitate their grievances. In all such cases appeals were provided to the Appellate Tribunal and further appeal was provided from the order of the Appellate Tribunal to the Administrator under Section 347B. Section 347E was providing for a complete bar on the power of a civil court to entertain any suit/application or other proceedings in respect of any order or notice appealable under Section 343 or Section 347B. Since the learned Single Judge has not looked into the issue required by law to be looked into and the error in the impugned decision is to overlook the distinction where jurisdiction of a civil court is expressly barred under a statute and where the jurisdiction is impliedly barred due to a remedy available under a statute but the remedy is onerous and has also not looked into the pleadings to determine whether a limited window was opened to the plaintiffs to maintain the civil action - We dispose of the two appeals declaring that there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of a suit challenging assessment and levy of property tax under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, but the scope of the suit would be limited i.e. the challenge would be limited in light of the law declared. The Registry is directed to list the suit for directions before the Roster Bench on August 10, 2015.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the civil suit challenging the assessment and levy of property tax.
2. Interpretation of statutory provisions and judicial precedents regarding jurisdictional bars.
3. Adequacy and onerousness of statutory remedies provided under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
4. Distinction between express and implied bars to civil court jurisdiction.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of the Civil Suit:
The primary issue was whether the civil suit filed by the appellants challenging the assessment and levy of property tax under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (DMC Act) was maintainable. The learned Single Judge held that the suit was not maintainable based on the precedent set in Satish Chand's case, which implied that such matters should be addressed by the Municipal Taxation Tribunal as provided under the DMC Act. However, the appellants argued that the statutory remedy was onerous due to the requirement to deposit the disputed tax amount before the appeal could be heard, thereby making the civil suit a necessary recourse.

2. Interpretation of Statutory Provisions and Judicial Precedents:
The court analyzed various judicial precedents and statutory provisions to determine the maintainability of the suit. The learned Single Judge had overlooked the distinction between express and implied bars to civil court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Dhulabhai's case laid down principles for determining when civil court jurisdiction is excluded, emphasizing that express bars in statutes must be respected, but implied bars should not be readily inferred. The court noted that the DMC Act did not contain an express bar against civil suits challenging property tax assessments, unlike the Punjab Municipal Act, which had an express bar under Section 86.

3. Adequacy and Onerousness of Statutory Remedies:
The court considered whether the statutory remedy provided under the DMC Act was adequate. The appellants had initially filed an appeal but abandoned it due to the onerous condition of depositing the disputed tax amount. The court referred to precedents such as Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which held that if a statutory remedy is onerous, it cannot be considered adequate, thereby justifying the maintainability of a civil suit. The court also referenced Indian Hotels Company Limited v. New Delhi Municipal Council, which highlighted that the requirement of pre-deposit could negate the right of appeal.

4. Distinction Between Express and Implied Bars:
The court emphasized the distinction between express and implied bars to civil court jurisdiction. An express bar, as seen in the Punjab Municipal Act, clearly prohibits civil suits, whereas an implied bar arises when a statute creates a special right and remedy, suggesting that the statutory remedy is exclusive. The court concluded that the DMC Act did not expressly bar civil suits and that the statutory remedy was onerous, thus not precluding the jurisdiction of civil courts.

Conclusion:
The court set aside the impugned order dated November 17, 2014, and restored the civil suit (CS(OS) No.814/2014) for fresh determination on its maintainability by the learned Single Judge. The court declared that there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of a suit challenging the assessment and levy of property tax under the DMC Act, 1957, but the scope of such a suit would be limited in light of the legal principles established by the Supreme Court and Division Benches of the High Court. The Registry was directed to list the suit for directions before the Roster Bench on August 10, 2015. No costs were awarded.