9911796707
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Issues:
1. Setting aside of arbitration awards under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 2. Interference with discretionary jurisdiction of arbitrators. 3. Grounds for setting aside an award. Detailed Analysis: 1. The judgment involves appeals against a common order passed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, where the appeals filed by the appellants were dismissed, challenging the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the same High Court. The Single Judge had allowed applications filed by the respondent to set aside awards made by the Arbitrators in two separate arbitration cases. The respondent sought further opportunity to lead evidence after missing a scheduled hearing, which led to the awards being challenged under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Single Judge accepted the respondent's case, setting aside the awards and remitting the matters to the Arbitrators for fresh disposal, which was upheld by the Appellate Bench, leading to the appeals before the Supreme Court. 2. The main issue for consideration was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretionary jurisdiction of the arbitrators in setting aside the awards solely based on the respondent's failure to appear for scheduled evidence. The arbitrators had decided to close the proceedings and make the award after the respondent and their advocate failed to appear on the scheduled date, despite being present on the previous date. The respondent later sought another opportunity to lead evidence, which was denied by the arbitrators. The High Court's interference was questioned based on the limited grounds provided under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, which does not include the arbitrator's decision on granting or refusing an adjournment. 3. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 outlines the grounds for setting aside an award, which include arbitrator misconduct, awards made after superseding arbitration, or awards improperly procured. The Supreme Court emphasized the limited jurisdiction of the civil court to interfere with arbitration awards, highlighting that the court cannot reevaluate evidence or substitute its evaluation for that of the arbitrator. The court cited previous judgments to support the restrictive nature of Section 30 and the finality of arbitrator decisions chosen by the parties. The court concluded that the High Court erred in setting aside the awards to give the defaulting respondent another opportunity to lead evidence, as the arbitrator's decision on adjournment did not fall within the grounds for setting aside an award. In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, and restored the awards made by the arbitrators, emphasizing the limited grounds for setting aside arbitration awards under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
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