2006 (8) TMI 670 - SC - Indian Laws

Inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code - Challenged the Order passed by High Court - quashing the proceedings instituted on the basis of the FIR lodged - Jurisdiction of Central Bureau of Investigation ( CBI ) to register the FIR - commission of offences punishable under Sections 120B 167 168 177A of the Indian Penal Code 1860 ( IPC ) and Sections 13(2) and 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 ( PC Act ) - HELD THAT - If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code. It is not however necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide frivolous or vexatious in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. Coming to the pivotal stand of respondent no.1 as has been rightly submitted by leaned counsel for the appellant there is no notification revoking the earlier notification. The letter on which great emphasis has been laid by the respondent no.1 and highlighted by the High Court the authority to write the letter has not been indicated. It has also not been established that the person was authorized to take a decision. In any event the same does not meet requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution. The letter is not even conceptually a notification. High Court was therefore not justified in holding that there was a notification rescinding earlier notification. The High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings instituted on the basis of the FIR lodged. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of CBI to register FIR under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
2. Validity of High Court's exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3. Requirement of specific authorization for officers under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of CBI to Register FIR:
The primary issue was whether the CBI had jurisdiction to register an FIR against respondent no.1 under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. The respondent contended that the CBI lacked jurisdiction as the consent necessary from the State of Rajasthan had been withdrawn. The respondent relied on a letter dated 26.6.1999 from the Special Officer (Home), Secretary, Department, which allegedly indicated the withdrawal of consent extended in 1956 and again in 1989. The High Court accepted this argument, noting that the consent given in 1956 and extended in 1989 had become inoperative after the State Government refused to extend the provisions of the Act to the whole of Rajasthan.

In contrast, the Supreme Court found that there was no notification revoking the earlier consent. The letter cited by the respondent did not meet the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution of India and could not be considered a valid notification. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating the letter as a notification rescinding the earlier consent.

2. Validity of High Court's Exercise of Power under Section 482 of the Code:
The CBI argued that the High Court improperly exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash the FIR. The Supreme Court reiterated that the exercise of power under Section 482 is an exception and not the rule. The inherent jurisdiction may be exercised to give effect to an order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice. The Court emphasized that this power must be exercised sparingly and with caution.

The Supreme Court cited precedents, including R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, outlining categories where the inherent power to quash proceedings may be justified. The Court found that the High Court's decision to quash the FIR did not fall within these categories, as the proceedings were not manifestly illegal, frivolous, or vexatious.

3. Requirement of Specific Authorization for Officers:
The respondent contended that for the CBI officers to function under the Act, they needed to be individually notified, and a general notification would not suffice. The High Court accepted this argument, stating that individual authorization was necessary.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed, referring to precedents such as Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. and Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay. The Court clarified that a general notification authorizing the entire force of the Delhi Special Police Establishment was sufficient and complied with the provisions of the Act. The Court held that there was no requirement for specific orders for each officer.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the CBI had jurisdiction to register the FIR and that the High Court improperly exercised its power under Section 482 of the Code. The requirement for specific authorization of officers was also dismissed, affirming that a general notification was adequate. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings based on the FIR were reinstated.